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Abstract 
 
 
With the enlargement of the EU to 27 member states in 2007, this thesis 
considers the transition process of Romania and Bulgaria from the fall of 
communism in 1989 to accession to the European Union in 2007.   The 
research focuses on the political and economic reforms of Romania and 
Bulgaria, using a chronological approach, to explore the concept of EU impact 
on countries in transition.  The thesis focuses specifically on the ideas of 
European conditionality and leverage, in order to answer questions on the 
importance of the EU’s external influence on these two countries, as well as 
discussing future implications for candidate countries in transition. 
 1 
Introduction. 
 
On the 1st January 2007, the European Union welcomed its two newest 
members, Romania and Bulgaria.  This thesis is an attempt to understand the 
path these countries took to get to this end goal. Furthermore it will be seen 
that by analysing the path to transition for these two countries, there can be 
some understanding of the transition process in Eastern Europe in general, and 
how this transition process may have implications for future countries from 
this area of Europe wishing to become members of the Europe Club. 
 
The research question this thesis seeks to answer is : 
‘What impact has the European Union had on the process of transition 
from communism to multi-party democracy in Romania and Bulgaria 
from 1990 to the accession date of 2007?  How much of these changes 
can be directly linked to EU intervention, or would this transition have 
occurred to the same level without the influence of the EU? 
  
The nature of the above problem can be narrowed done to one key concept, 
the concept of European Union impact, especially when related to ideas of 
enlargement specifically targeted by the European Union.  It is necessary to 
understand for future enlargement prospects in Europe the role that the Union 
plays in this process, and this thesis is an attempt to gauge this role. 
 
The thesis consists of five parts.  The first part outlines the historical 
background of the two countries in question to show how past events and 
political and economic history have contributed to the two countries attitudes 
towards transition.  This section is intended to show how these events have 
impacted on the transition period from 1990, especially the post-1945 
communist period, to explain the relatively slow pace of reform change in 
Romania and Bulgaria in comparison to other ex-communist countries.  As 
European Union enlargement is a core idea of this thesis, this section focuses 
first on a brief overview of the European Union enlargement process in 
general, before examining in more depth the issue of enlargement in Bulgaria 
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and Romania.  This part of the research examines what role the European 
Union has had in the transition of these two countries, and whether the 
successful and relatively swift pace of reform from 2000 onwards is due to 
direct involvement with the EU enlargement process, or whether this process 
is more of a natural state, with influence from the EU not making much of an 
impact in the transition of Bulgaria and Romania   
 
 
The second part of the work is concerned with the European Union and its 
approach to Eastern European enlargement: methodology and theory.  This 
section is a detailed analysis of the European Union and Eastern European 
relationship, specifically the approach to enlargement, both with Eastern 
Europe in general and Romania and Bulgaria in specific.  As this project is 
primarily literature based, this section draws heavily on theory to explain the 
relationship between the EU and Eastern Europe.  One of the major theories 
that this thesis has relied on to gauge the impact of the EU on countries in 
transition that this thesis is focused on, Bulgaria and Romania, is Vachudova’s 
theory of ‘active and passive leverage’. As the author has applied this theory 
to Romania and Bulgaria this thesis compares Vachudova’s theory to other 
theories of eastern enlargement such as Grabbe’s theory of European 
conditionality being the driving force behind post-communist transition.  By 
applying both of these theories to Bulgaria and Romania it will be possible to 
have a clearer picture on how the desire for EU membership has shaped the 
transition goals of Romania and Bulgaria, as well as yielding some answers as 
to whether the transition process has been guided or forced by the European 
Union. Pridham and Dinan both have variations on theses theories to explain 
EU impact on countries in transition.  Dinan’s theory is analysed to see if his 
assertion that the EU’s primary concern in strengthening ties with Eastern 
Europe can be seen as mainly focused from an economic integration point of 
view, whilst emphasising the importance of security in the region can be 
directly applied to the European Union and Romania and Bulgaria, as is his 
discussion on the EU member states attitude of fear towards Eastern Europe, 
citing the Union’s  desire for EU enlargement as a defence against mass 
migration, causing these states to cooperate with enlargement based on the 
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ideas of asylum, immigration and policing. Van Oderanan discusses the desire 
for Romania and Bulgaria to strengthen this relationship as a valuable tool for 
protection against the instability of the former Soviet Union and the desire to 
have input into the institutions shaping the development of Europe, and this 
theory is analysed to see if it has any relevance to the development of the EU-
EE relationship.   
 
Bell attempts to make a case that EU enlargement for Bulgaria would be a 
concrete way to escape its past alliance with the Soviet Union and to improve 
global relations, and this theory has been tested to see whether this is a key 
issue in Bulgarian reform, or just another stepping stone in the path to the EU.  
One of the major theories that cannot be ignored is the theory of ‘return to 
Europe’ mentioned in the texts of Cameron, Mair and Croft.  As this has 
become a well recognised theory, this thesis will examine what impact this 
theory has had on the relationship between the EU and Eastern Europe, in 
relation to both political and economic transition.  By analysing the theories 
listed above this thesis attempts to draw a picture of the relationship between 
the EU and Eastern Europe, a picture that has importance when examining the 
accession process for Romania and Bulgaria, and examining the impact of the 
European Union on these two countries in transition. 
 
Part three focuses on the chronological timeline of transition in Romania and 
Bulgaria.  The thesis takes a timeline approach from the fall of communism in 
1989 onwards, outlining key economic and political events, governmental and 
institutional change and judicial reform to show how effective transition has 
been in these two countries.  Analysis is made using governmental 
documentation from the two countries in question, European Union Annual 
Reports on the progress towards reform in these countries, statistics from 
organisations such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for 
Restructuring their Economies) and EBRD (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) to track both economic reform, and the 
implementation of legislation from both countries to outline judicial reform.  
Special care has been taken to analyse the attitude of both of these countries to 
transition in general, with the chronological approach taken helping to show 
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how transparent the reform process has been.  By analysing the government’s 
attitude to reform, an accurate gauge can be drawn to see the desire for real 
reform in these countries, and by accurately analysing the government’s 
attitude to reform this also makes the government’s attitudes towards EU 
accession clear, an important factor in the transition progress of these two 
countries.  Special attention is paid to the events of 1996-1997 in Eastern 
Europe, as these can be seen as the years when the reform process changed 
dramatically in both Romania and Bulgaria, and marks the crucial turning 
point for transition in these two countries, enabling them to become new 
Member States of the European Union in 2007. 
 
Poole lays much emphasis on the desire of Eastern European countries to enter 
the eurozone, planning on enlargement as a way to gain increased stability and 
higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI).  This theory will be used to 
establish whether enlargement remains for both countries as a means to 
establish a stable economic system, or whether the desire to enter the 
European Union consists of a more multi-faceted approach, desiring not just 
economic stability but political and social reform to the point where these 
countries can be considered as having returned to Europe.  Primary documents 
from these two countries and the European Union have been used to highlight 
major developments, especially from 1996 onwards to see if there can be 
pinpointed any reasons for why certain reforms happened when they did, and 
whether these reforms had been forced by the EU, or if there can be seen to be 
a clear desire by leading elites to make these changes (with the goal of 
membership an added bonus)  Some simple analysis of economic data is used 
to help gauge if  there was a genuine desire for change or whether governing 
agencies saw EU membership as a way to secure financial and political 
security for these two countries.  The European Commission has a regular 
reporting policy on countries in transition, as well as a well defined framework 
for accession contained in the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis 
communautaire.  By using these regular reports issued by the Commission as a 
basis for analysis, this research tracks how the reports have influenced the 
transition of these two countries from 1989, before focusing more closely on 
the reform process from 2000, to gauge how much impact the EU has had on 
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reform in Romania and Bulgaria.  As both these countries signed accession 
partnerships in 2000, the Regular Reports from the Commission that follow 
from this date are important to analyse, while other important documents 
produced in this period including the 2002 Roadmaps for Romania and 
Bulgaria, and the financial package documents of 2004, (which also contain 
valuable instructions and assessments on the viability of accession to the 
Union) are analysed in the research and their importance is not taken lightly.  
The Commission documents are also important in helping to explain 
governmental and institutional change in this time period, as well as assisting 
to assess the importance of EU documentation in helping to create change in 
countries in transition.   The adoption and implementation of legislation is also 
an important process of countries in transition and no analysis of the transition 
of Romania and Bulgaria would be complete without chronicling the major 
impact of legislative reform on the transition process of these two countries. 
 
The fourth part of this thesis is concerned with the central idea guiding this 
work, the key concept of impact: the impact that the European Union has had 
on the pace of reform in Romania and Bulgaria.  This section focuses on the 
outcomes of the research in the previous parts of the thesis to give an accurate 
picture of the specific areas that have been impacted by the European Union.  
This focuses primarily on the transition in the areas of economic, political and 
institutional change, and by looking at these three key reform issues, European 
Union impact can be judged as to its importance in the transition process.  The 
research contained in the above sections will show just how important the 
European Union is to the process of reform in general in post-communist 
countries and this will have implications for countries that are still regarded as 
potential candidates and these countries will need to take lessons from the 
accession progress of Romania and Bulgaria if they do intend to become part 
of the Union at some point in the future. 
 
The concluding part of the thesis is concerned with the situation of Romania 
and Bulgaria post-accession.  This section investigates the continued pace of 
reform in Romania and Bulgaria since 2007, and examines the effectiveness of 
European conditionality and leverage once a country has become a Member 
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State.  Can any conclusions be drawn from the accession experiences of 
Romania and Bulgaria in respect to further European enlargement to the East?  
The last section of this research, before moving onto the conclusionary 
statements, focuses on answering this question, examining how the accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria may have very real consequences for candidate and 
potential candidate countries in the future. 
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2. Romania and Bulgaria before and during communism 
 
In looking at the post-communist transformation of countries such as Bulgaria 
and Romania, there must be no discounting the importance of the political and 
economic history of these regions. An analysis of the past history can help in 
some way to explain the path of reform in these two countries, with the history 
of stability, both economic and political, in Romania and Bulgaria, being 
important in helping to explain the cautious approach to reform taken by the 
first post-communist governments in these two countries after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.  It is necessary therefore to examine briefly the history of 
Romania and Bulgaria, before moving on to a more detailed analysis of how 
this history has impacted on the transition period from 1990.  This chapter 
intends to outline the history of these two countries, as a general overview, 
with conclusions about how this history relates to the situation in both 
Romania and Bulgaria in 1989, before moving onto a comparative analysis of 
the Romanian and Bulgarian communist system and governance, with the last 
sections examining the relationship between Eastern Europe and the European 
Union in general before focusing on the ties between Romania, Bulgaria , and 
the West. 
2.1 A Short history of Romania and Bulgaria until 1989 
 
Nelson states that the ‘principal dilemma of Romania’s pre-communist 
political heritage was conflict between dominant social interests and state 
interests, that is, between Romanian society and those who controlled the 
Romanian polity’ 1  This statement can be applied to all aspects of Romania’s 
political history from the country’s beginnings as a Dacian state in 513 BC, 
made up of various principalities until the 11th Century when different parts of 
the territory were controlled by various Empires, until the Middle Ages, when 
the larger principalities such as Moldavia and Wallachia came under the 
control of the Ottoman Empire.  The entire Balkan Peninsula and most of 
                                                 
1
 Daniel N Nelson, Romania in the 1980's, . Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe (Westview Press, Boulder,  1981). p 17 
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Hungary had come under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire by 1541, as 
designated Ottoman provinces, while Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylavania 
retained some autonomy, coming under Ottoman suzerainty until the 18th 
Century. The ‘National Awakening of Romania’ began in 1848, bringing 
revolution to Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania (which had become a 
territory in the Habsburgs Austrian Empire).2  This was the first step towards 
the formation of what is today seen as modern Romania, spurring the national 
movement towards independence from the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires 
and bringing together a group of territories united both in their language and 
interest. 
 
As the Renaissance began in Europe in the 14th century, Western and Eastern 
Europe began to change.  As the West was beginning to see reform as a 
consolidation of national consciousness (one of the guiding ideas of the 
Renaissance) in the East any awareness of this national consciousness was 
hidden beneath religious and feudal loyalties.3   From a historical perspective 
feudalism can been seen to be  a regime of under-development, and the lack of 
reform due to this underdevelopment was to have major implications for 
Romania in terms of growth towards multi-party democracy.  Romanian 
history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be characterised by the 
desire to unite all the Principalities under one common leader and the 
evolution of what can be termed today as modern Romania took two centuries 
to occur, starting from the latter part of the eighteenth century and not being 
completed until the end of World War II in 1945.  These two centuries were 
also the period that established Romania’s policy towards Russia, a policy that 
was to have far-reaching effects on Romania’s communist and post-
communist relations with that country, mostly stemming from the loss of 
territory due to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin and the perceived growth in Russian 
power due to the Russo-Turkish Wars.  
 
                                                 
2
 For a good general overview of Romanian history please see Kenneth Johnstone The Place of 
Romania in European History: Part One and Two’ History Today, May 1978, Vol. 28, Issue 5, and 
Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)  
3
 Robin Okey, Eastern Europe 1740-1890: Feudalism to Communism (London: Hutchinson and Co 
Ltd, 1982) pp 17-20 
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Romania in the second half of the eighteenth century turned first to Russia to 
help overthrow Ottoman domination. The Russian response, which at first 
seemed a benign influence, helped at first to undermine the Ottoman leaders in 
individual principalities, but this situation was soon to change as Russia 
became steadily more aggressive, annexing territory and causing Romania to 
fear that the country would be swapping Ottoman rule for that of Russian.4   A 
revolution by Romanian national movements was stalled by the Russians in 
1848, but helped to highlight to world powers the genuine desire of the 
Romanian nationalists for independence.   With the signing of the Treaty of 
San Stefano (1878) relations between Russia and Romania became even more 
strained, as, even though the Treaty signified the end of Ottoman rule, 
Romanian territory (notably southern Bessarabia) was ceded to the Russians.  
Figure 1 outlines the territory that made up the independent state of Romania 
from this point until the start of WWI.    
 
Figure 1:  Romanian territory 1878-1913 
 
After Romania gained her independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, it 
was left to the two dominant political parties: The Conservatives and the 
Liberals, who were left to define political, economic and foreign policy for the 
new nation state. With the ratifying of the Romanian Constitution 
(promulgated in 1866 and implemented after Romanian independence), the 
principle of separation of powers and the mechanism of democratic checks 
                                                 
4
 Hitchins, p 4 
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and balances was, in theory, put into practise. The Constitution established a 
civil service, systems of finance and a small national militia.5  While the 
Constitution, and the revisions to it made in 1884 resembled very much a 
democratic constitution of today, the reality of Romanian party politics at this 
time was that it was a constitution on paper only, with parties showing scant 
respect for the laws which they themselves had formulated.   
 
 Politics in Romania had remained strictly confined to the landlord class, and 
by 1869 elections were more about ratifying changes of government already 
made by the monarchy.6 It was not until the proclamation of Romania as a 
Kingdom and the achievement of independence in 1878 that there was any 
significant change to the idea of national development for the new nation state.   
There was an attempt by the governing bodies to address national issues such 
as the adoption of a national monetary system, and the formation of the 
Romanian banking industry.  The importance of reform to encourage the 
growth of industry, based on the progress of the industrial revolution in 
Western Europe, was an idea that politicians of both Liberal and Conservative 
persuasion were eager to put into place.  However, because of the large 
peasant base in Romania, this predominantly agrarian society did not achieve 
any significant industrialisation before 1914. Barington Moore’s thesis argues 
persuasively that the existence of a relatively strong landlord class influences 
the political structure, and events between 1870 and 1939 directly relate to the 
situation in Romania, from the first glimmerings of independence from the 
Ottoman Empire, especially when taking into account active opposition to 
democratic regimes by the reigning landlord class,7 who were also major 
actors in the political system. 
  
  Romanian foreign policy at this time can be shown to be one of neutrality, 
with Hitchins stating that ‘the political structure of the Romanian Kingdom 
between 1881-1914 remained essentially that of the Principality’8.   Foreign 
                                                 
5
 Johnstone, p 321 
6
 Okey, p 136 
7John Stephens, John and G. Kőmmel, in  Authoritarianism and Democracy in Europe 1919-1939, 
(Houndsmills :Palgrave Macmillian, 2002), p 52 
8
 Keith Hitchins, Rumania: 1866-1947, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p 90. 
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policy during this time period can be related directly to Romania’s position in 
the world in the future, both under a communist and post-communist political 
system.  The alliances that Romania started to form in this period were to have 
far-reaching implications for Romania in the 20th and 21st Centuries.  One of 
the most important and influential influences on Romania was that of France.  
Louis Napoleon (1808-1873) was instrumental in smoothing the way for the 
new, united Romania in 1859.9  This was the start of the Franco-Romanian 
Alliance which was to prove influential, especially in Romania’s dealings with 
Western Europe in the 20th Century, culminating in the Franco-Romanian 
Treaty of Alliance and Friendship signed in 1926. 10   Romania looked to 
France for blueprints for its educational, cultural and military models.  As 
mentioned earlier in this section, it is from this time period also that can be 
traced Romania’s animosity to Russia, which was the precursor of future 
Romanian-Soviet relations, especially in regards to Romania’s place in the 
Soviet Bloc during the Cold War, due to the territory disputes during the time 
of the consultation on the Treaty of Berlin and the promises made that 
Romania considered were not kept under this Treaty. 
      
Before WWI Romania was a constitutional monarchy based on a two-party 
system alternating between Conservative and Liberal parties, and the territorial 
reunification of Romania at the end of WWI in  1918 led to the creation of an 
unstructured multi-party system, based around the unification project as 
opposed to a  true ideological reform.11   Romania’s foreign policy position at 
this point in time was still one of neutrality. The Romanian government feared 
that her geographic position would put the country in the path of the escalating 
conflict, with lack of preparedness of the Romanian army to fight in the war, 
opposing views in the parliament about which side to support and the 
aggressive behaviour of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia helping to maintain a 
position of neutrality for Romania until 1916.12 This position was not a factor 
                                                 
9
 Kenneth Johnstone, ‘The Place of Romania in European History: Part One’ History Today, May 
1978, Vol. 28 Issue 5 pp313-321, p 321 
10
 Dennis Deletant ‘A Balancing Act- Romania 1919-40’ History Today, June 1992, Vol. 42, Issue 6, 
pp48-54, p 50 
11
 Alexandru Jereb, The Road to Europe II: When Will the Next Enlargement Occur?, Southeast 
European Politics, November 2005, Vol. VI, No. 2 pp 126-138 
12
 Hitchins, p 251 
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during WWI, as both secret treaties and the desire for further territorial 
expansion overthrew any political strategy to stay neutral and in 1916 
Romania entered World War One on the side of the Entente, after being 
promised recognition of Romanian rights over Transylvania.  By May 1918 
Romania had been defeated, negotiating a peace treaty with Germany and re-
entering the war in November 1918.  This resulted in the birth of Greater 
Romania (Romania Mare) after the disintegration of both the Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian empires.  Figure 2 shows the newly united territories of 
Romania at the end of WWI, indicative of the nation state of today. 
 
Figure 2: Greater Romania 1920-1940 
 
 Okey has described the period 1918-1939 as ‘unique in the modern history of 
Eastern Europe’.13  This was the only time period until after 1989 that 
Romania, (as well as other states in Central and Eastern Europe) enjoyed an 
similarity of political system with that of their western counterparts, Deletant 
calling the position of Romania in the interwar period ‘in many respects 
typical of the so-called ‘successor’ states created from the dismemberment of 
the three empires of the Hapsburgs, Ottomans and Romanovs’14, a view 
                                                 
13
 Okey, p 157 
14
 Deletant, p 49 
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supported by Petrovic, characterising the similarity of political conditions in 
Romania with those of other Eastern and Central Eastern states at this time.15 
   The adoption of the 1923 Constitution established Romania as a democracy, 
even though this cannot be characterised as a totally stable system when 
compared to other countries in Western Europe at this time, with the 
Romanian version of democracy only continuing through until the 
establishment of the royal dictatorship in 1938. The distinctive difference in 
this region of Europe was the fact that the failure of peasant movements to 
effectively mobilise raised the prospect of more militant movements coming to 
power, from both the left and right political spectrum.  This can be 
characterised in Romania in the growth of first royal and then military 
dictatorships leading up to WWII.  Stephens and Kőmmel characterise the 
Romanian governments’ failure to carry out effective land reform contributing 
to the failure of a full transformation of rural class relations, leading to the 
growth of militant movements in Romania.16 Fischer-Galati blames the failure 
of the peacemakers at the end of WWI to ‘address and resolve issues relevant 
to peace in Europe in general and Eastern Europe in particular’17 to help 
explain the number of crises facing Romania in the interwar years, and the 
move towards right-leaning dictatorships, whilst Deletant states that  
 
‘…in the enlarged Romanian state, problems which, in the brief 
interlude of the inter-war period, Romania’s leaders had little time, 
capacity and the will to address.  The failure to solve them (and the 
Western democracies provided precious little help to this end) was to 
blight the country’s progress towards modernisation and the exercise 
of genuine democratic rule’18      
 
Hitchins characterises the period between the two World Wars as that of ‘the 
Great Debate” in which two broad groupings of intellectuals (designated as 
                                                 
15
 Milenko Petrovic, “The role of geography and history in determining the slower progress of post-
communist transition in the Balkans”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41 (2008) pp 123-145, 
p 135 
16
 Stephens and Kőmmel, p 57 
17
 Stephen Fischer-Galati “Romania, Crisis without Compromise” in The Conditions of Democracy in 
Europe 19-39 (Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell, eds) (, New York :St Martins Press , 2000)  
18
 Deletant, p 51 
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Europeans and traditionalists) sought to define how the country should 
develop.19  The former treated Romania as a part of Europe, and insisted that 
the country needed to follow the example of urbanisation and industrialisation 
of the West, while the traditionalists sought to define Romania’s agrarian 
character as its defining social and cultural heritage.20   
A combination of these theories can go towards explaining the fact that from 
1918-1938 Romania was only nominally a liberal constitutional monarchy (the 
only time in the country’s history until 1989) before being transformed into a 
system of dictatorship, both military and monarchical until 1944.  Monarchical 
dictatorship was first entered into in 1938 as an attempt by King Carol II 
(1893-1953) to negate the growing popularity of the right-wing party (Totul 
pentru łară, more commonly known as the Iron Guard). Carol II dissolved the 
party political system, and abolished the Constitution on 1923, announcing 
sweeping changes to Romanian law, and focusing on suppressing political 
opposition.21  However, massive popular support for the Iron Guard meant that 
by 1940 Carol II had no option but to legitimise the Iron Guard as part of the 
continuation of his dictatorship, and, with the beginning of WWII, Carol 
turned to General Ion Antonescu (leader of the Iron Guard) to help maintain 
control over the country.  With German support, Carol II was forced to 
abdicate, the newly crowned King Michael quickly giving Antonescu full 
powers as leader of the state, thus completing the transfer of power to the 
military dictatorship of the Iron Guard, with the monarchy remaining only as a 
figurehead.22   WWII and its aftermath changed the political spectrum in both 
Romania and in Europe as a whole, with the two halves of Europe becoming 
separated by the Iron Curtain, due to the end of WWII, until the collapse of the 
Soviet system in 1989. 
 
The end of WWII signalled the end of Romania’s development towards multi-
party democracy, which had first been terminated in the 1930’s before being 
sidelined by the World War.  After the overthrow of the Antonescu 
dictatorship in 1944, Romania was occupied by the Soviet army, whose first 
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action was the elevation of the Romanian communist party to power, and the 
signing of an armistice agreement that included  millions of dollars of 
reparations to the Soviet Union for losses during military operations on its 
territory,   Romania was placed under the Soviet sphere of influence under the 
‘percentage agreements’ in what Crampton has described as a ‘cavalier 
attitude’23 , and had adopted the Soviet style command economy and the 
creation of a communist-style People’s Republic by 1947, mostly due to two 
years of Romanian Communist Party agitation to create a large bloc of 
political parties to legitimise Party control of the country, and oppress any 
potential opposition.24  After the elections of 1946, the leading bloc of parties 
reorganised the governmental system and set about to eliminate any opposition 
and tighten control of the economy, introducing central planning.  After 
removing all opposition through waves of arrests and by forcing the King to 
abdicate, on 30 December 1947 the Romanian People’s Republic was 
announced.25    However, Romania can be seen to be a uniquely independent 
state in the Soviet system. Its continued animosity to Russia, formulated in the 
nineteenth century, enabled the state to develop an autonomy from some 
aspects of the Soviet Bloc, including Romania’s refusal to take side with the 
Soviet Union in its conflict with China, its decision to pursue trading and 
foreign aid links with the West , and its unique style of political leadership, 
encompassing dictatorship under the authoritarian governance of Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej  (leader 1948-1965) and Nicolae Ceauşescu (leader 1965-
1989) as well as its desire to follow traditional Soviet planned economy norms 
of industrialisation and centralisation.   
 
Both of these leaders enforced upon their countrymen a communist-style rule, 
complete with total state control of enterprises, no freedom of speech or 
association, the occasional purge of ‘state enemies’ and a powerful police 
state.  Ceauşescu’s denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
made the country seem more palatable to the West, solidifying trade and aid 
linkages and helping to give the dictator a more positive image both in 
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Romania and the rest of the world.  The country was rewarded for its more 
independent leadership style (than other Central and East Europe countries) 
with the offer of special agreements with the European Economic Community 
(EEC) concerning trade and the liberalisation of import quotas.26   This 
situation was not to last, as by the late 1970’s the economic situation in 
Eastern Europe was worsening, Romania being heavily in debt to the West.  
While this was not unique in Eastern Europe, Ceauşescus reaction to the rising 
debt level was.   Unlike other Eastern European countries where some small 
reforms were made to the economy, in order to hold off the worst effects of 
the worsening situation, (for example small business liberalisation and some 
forms of agricultural reform) Ceauşescu’s solution to the economic problem 
was to tighten his grip on the country and to push his citizenship into 
overdrive to try and pay back the Western debt at a faster rate than was 
required.  This not only severely impoverished the country but also plunged it 
into an overwhelming financial crisis by the mid-1980’s. The combination of 
this financial situation and the Communist Party’s refusal to even consider any 
sort of reform (even mild reforms as mentioned earlier) was to lead to 
disastrous results for the country in 1989.  Figure 4 gives an indication, using 
GDP as a measure, to show how lack of economic reforms contributed to a 
worsening economic situation, and just how important the goal of European 
Union membership is to a country in financial crisis as it can be seen that after 
the conscious decision to actively pursue EU membership, the economic 
situation improved dramatically. 
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Romania GDP by Expenditure (US$ millions)
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
Romania
 
Figure 3: Romania - Gross Domestic Product 1980-2005 by expenditure (Data source: OECD) 
 
Romania’s unique form of ‘independence’ from the Kremlin allowed the 
Ceauşescu dictatorship to dismiss any of the reform developments in the 
Soviet Union in the 1980’s such as glastnost and perestroika as irrelevant to 
the Romania, as any call for reform was seen by the governing body as a 
betrayal of the national interest. 27  This was to mean that reform, in the form 
of revolution, when it came about in 1989, was not as peaceful and bloodless 
as carried out in other Central and Eastern countries, but resulted in a violent 
overthrow of the leading powers and the execution of the Ceauşescus’ in  
December 1989.  Speculation exists about whether this revolution was the 
product of a carefully planned coup or an involvement by the second-hand 
communist elite28.  Regardless of the background to the revolution, by the end 
of 1989 there was a significant power shift in the governance of Romania, 
from a Stalinist dictatorship to a nominal multi-party system headed by a 
political party composed mainly of reconstructed communist elites who still 
maintained rule using primarily communist means.  This will be examined 
more closely in the following chapters to show how this lack of a real change 
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of government has had a direct and lasting impact on the economic and 
political transition of Romania, and its goal of joining the European Union. 
 
The development of Bulgaria into today’s nation state can be contrasted 
sharply with the history of Romania detailed above.  Settled by the Bulgars in 
the 7th century from Central Asia, this ethnic group merged with the local 
Slavic inhabitants to form the first Bulgarian State (7C-10C), which  was 
characterised by the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet, and the establishment of 
the Christian Church.  The Second Bulgarian State (1185-1382)  saw the 
expansion of Bulgaria until it dominated the Balkans,  and the eventual 
independence of Bulgaria from Byzantine.  1382 saw the establishment of 
Ottoman Bulgaria, which was to last until the ‘national awakening of 
Bulgaria’ in the nineteenth century.  Bulgaria was to liberated in 1878 by an 
army consisting mostly of Russians during the Russo-Turkish Wars (1876-78).  
This liberation was to shape the course of Bulgaria’s strong alliance with 
Russia, which was to have lasting consequences on Bulgarian foreign policy in 
regards to the Soviet Union post pre and post WWII.  The liberation of 
Bulgaria resulted in the development of the Bulgarian state, which covered the 
territory of Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia.  Because of Bulgaria’s strong ties 
with Russia, the Great Powers scaled back the original plans of the Bulgarian 
boundaries, fearing an upset in the balance of power in Europe, especially in 
regards to the establishment of a large Russian state which could be perceived 
as a threat to the Great Powers. As a result of this, the original boundaries 
were scaled back, with the new Treaty of Berlin (1878) establishing the 
Principality of Bulgaria, which was nominally under Ottoman rule but was 
ruled by a Prince elected by Bulgarian nobles and approved by the Great 
Powers.  (see Figure 4 for a map of Bulgarian territories) 
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Figure 4:  Bulgarian Territory established under the Treaty of Berlin 1878 
 
By 1883 Bulgaria was firmly within the sphere of Russian influence, and the 
first socialist party based on Marxist principles was established in the country 
by 1891.   Russians were also very much a part of Bulgarian politics partly due 
to the popular respect held for them by the country.  They had great influence 
over the Bulgarian army as most of the officers and all of the senior officers 
were Russian, as was the Minister of War.29    As with Romania, Bulgaria had 
the appearance of a stable democracy, but the reality was that Bulgaria was a 
democratic state characterised by government instability.   The major 
instability factor was the divide between the two most powerful political 
groups, the Conservatives and the Liberals,  and much of this time period 
involved many unstable government coalitions between these two parties, with 
overall power resting in the hands of the Conservative appointed Prince, who 
(under the Turnovo Constitution) was commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, could convene, prorogue or dissolve the assembly and had to give 
consent before any legislation could be adopted.30  The 1883 parliamentary 
coalition was seen as a temporary coalition to try and bring about some 
                                                 
29
 R.J.Crampton, , Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History, (New York :Columbia University Press, 1983) ,p 37 
30
 R J Crampton, Bulgaria  (Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2007) , p 99 
 20 
stability, and to a certain extent this was achieved, as the years 1883-5 were 
the most stable period in Bulgarian politics before the end of WWII.  The only 
major conflict during this time was with the Liberal government attitude 
towards Russia. Whilst the Conservatives were content to accept this coalition 
government, hoping it would bring about a measure of constitutional reform, 
the Liberals had no intention of letting Russia dictate the terms of its foreign 
policy, especially in regards to the Russian control of the Bulgarian Army 
through its officer class.    For the Russians the Bulgarian army was important 
because in any forward move by the Russians in the Balkans the Bulgarian 
force would form a valuable role in the advance.  
 
 By 1885 Bulgaria was in a state of crisis again, fuelled by unstable political 
coalitions, massive corruption by government officials and social and 
economic unrest, a situation not unlike that in the early 1990’s. In addition to 
this was the short-lived war against Serbia (1885), in which Serbia demanded 
territorial reparation for Bulgarian attempts at territorial gain through the 
annexing of Eastern Rumelia.  The Bulgarians, even though victorious, were 
halted while on Serbian soil by Austro-Hungarian diplomatic intervention, and 
with the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest the following year, the status quo 
pre-1885 was maintained.31 The political situation of unstable coalitions was a 
cycle that Bulgaria would continue to revolve in until the Declaration of 
Independence in 1908. Both political and monarchical leaders struggled from 
1887-1908 to make any political headway, resulting in a number of coalition 
governments characterised by the frequent splintering of parties, with no 
strong political personality to challenge the growing authority of the 
monarchy.32 After the 1908 Declaration, one of the first actions of the new 
coalition government was to fall into support of Russian foreign policy.  
Crampton shows just how influential the foreign policy considerations of 
Russia were on the Bulgarian government, especially in regards to the Russian 
wish for a Balkan Alliance directed at the containment of Austria.33 
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By the outbreak of WWI Bulgaria had played an integral part in the Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913), and had become disenchanted with Russia regarding its 
perceived loss of territories and the rate of casualties sustained by the 
Bulgarian Army in these conflicts.  This led to Bulgaria maintaining a neutral 
position for the first year of WWI, before allying itself with Germany after the 
promise of territorial gain. A series of secret agreements were signed in 1915 
with Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, promising that if 
Bulgaria would join the Triple Alliance, Bulgaria (after Serbia’s defeat) would 
receive both zones of Macedonia and large piece of Serbian territory on the 
eastern bank of the River Morava.34  As Bulgaria’s fortunes began to wane by 
1917 (due the hardships suffered on the domestic front due to the War), the 
Russian Revolution helped to transform Bulgaria into a democratic republic in 
1917,(in conjunction with the collapse of the Bulgarian military and the 
invasion of French and British troops) but it wasn’t until 1920 that the first 
truly democratic election was held after two years of political infighting 
between the agrarians and the communists.  By 1923 the country had fallen 
back into the country’s usual cycle of political instability, not regaining any 
political or social stability until 1931, by which time the country was hit hard 
by the Great Depression.  Crampton defines this period as ‘fragile 
parliamentary rule’, a struggle between communists, agrarians, conservatives 
and liberals to both gain control of the country and introduce measures to help 
alleviate the Great Depression.35  
 
Following the outbreak of WWII, by 1941 Bulgaria  had signed the Tripartite 
Pact committing itself to the Axis, but never at any stage during WWII did it 
declare war on the Soviet Union, preferring to maintain the long-held ties with 
the country, even through a global event such as the Second World War.  As 
popular suspicion of Russia was not as intense as elsewhere in Europe, it was 
an easy transition for the Bulgarian Communist Party to be included in the 
government formed in 1944, and after two years of political manoeuvring, 
destroying first the old political system before eliminating their opposition  
and finally eliminating or taming all other political, social and cultural 
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organisations, and overcoming confrontations with both the agrarians and the 
military36,  in 1946 a republic along Soviet lines was declared.  
 
 
Figure. 5 Bulgaria 1946 -  
    
 
“ First, unlike all other ex-socialist countries, people in Bulgaria did  
not tend to perceive socialism as a consequence of Soviet occupation 
or Soviet presence.  Russia played a supportive and important role in 
the establishment of the Bulgarian state in 1878, so the Bulgarian 
public never considered the Soviet Union to be a hostile power.  
Additionally, there was never a Soviet military presence on Bulgarian 
territory”37  
 
This statement is the best summation of Bulgarian history under Soviet-style 
rule from 1946-1989.  Bulgaria can be characterised as the one state in the 
Soviet system that had no serious objections to any (or all) demands from the 
Soviet Union.   
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Bulgaria became a People’s Republic in 1946, and was the most stable Soviet 
ally until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989.  As part of both the Warsaw 
Pact and Comecon, Bulgaria followed closely Soviet doctrine, governing 
along the Stalinist line only as long as the Soviet Union, before implementing 
reforms after the death of Stalin as per the situation in U.S.S.R.  The first 
leader of Bulgaria, Dimitrov, was a staunch supporter of Stalin and his 
policies, implementing rapid industrialisation and economic reforms in line 
with Soviet policy.  Over-industrialisation was ‘exceptionally pronounced’38 
in Bulgaria, especially for a country so short on raw materials and totally 
dependant on the Soviet Union for such.  After Dimitrov’s death, and the 
death of Stalin, the leadership of the party first passed to Vulko Chervenkov 
(leader 1949-1953) who sovietised Bulgaria especially in relation to the 
economy, before Todor Zhivkov became the leader of the Party (in 1965) and 
continued to rule Bulgaria for the next thirty-three years.  Zhivkov, who had 
risen through the party ranks as Chervenkov’s right-hand man, managed to 
remove the only real threat to his leadership, Anton Yugov, using a skilful 
combination of Soviet support in the form of Kruschev with the expansion of 
his power base by bringing the political police under his control and aligning 
himself with various agricultural political parties39.  Relations with the West 
under Zhivkov were almost non-existent with Bulgaria being seen as one of 
the most oppressive regimes, following to the letter Soviet economic and 
social policy, with only a small amount of personal freedoms allowed.  As per 
other Central and Eastern states, corruption was a significant factor in 
governance, as was the implementation of a strict policy of heavy 
industrialisation, especially difficult in a country that had been so reliant on 
the agrarian lifestyle.  The 1956 ‘April Line’ policy implemented a rejection 
of the cult of personality so prevalent in early Stalinist systems and 
rehabilitated a number of earlier purge victims.  This is turn led to ‘Bulgaria’s 
Great Leap Forward’ an ambitious policy of economic reform characterised by 
more heavy industrialisation, which made Bulgaria more dependant on the 
Soviet Union, due to its lack of raw materials, and low reserves of fossil fuels.  
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This policy never came to full fruition, enforcing all the more the dependence 
on the Soviet state.  After the death of Stalin, Bulgaria, like other Soviet states 
went through a period of de-stalinisation.  Foreign relations with Greece were 
improved and there was some talk in the Communist Party leadership of 
repairing the breach with the USA and restoring diplomatic relations with 
Yugoslavia.40  Unlike Romania, these ideas were not followed through.  
Bulgaria benefited greatly from Comecon schemes for specialisation, the same 
schemes that Romania fought so hard against, (spurring the Romanian 
leadership to seek diplomatic and economic ties with the West) Bulgaria, 
being both dependant and subservient on the Soviet system, never really 
attempted to develop external ties with the West. 
 
By 1981 it was becoming clear to the Bulgarian leadership that the transfer 
from an extensive to an intensive economic system was almost impossible in 
the country.  This was made more difficult with the total dependence on the 
Soviet Union for oil, and by the view from the West, guided by the United 
States,  that Bulgaria was a country involved in ‘state-sponsored terrorism’.41  
As the economy weakened, fuelled by international debt (as in most Central 
and East Europe states), there can be no doubt that the situation in Bulgaria 
was very grave by 1989, a factor which helped to contribute to the fall of the 
leading role of the party in Bulgarian life.  Figure 6 can be seen as a useful 
indication of just how the economy weakened, especially from the 1980’s 
onwards, before the implementation of a true market economy from 1996, as 
Bulgaria began to actively pursue EU membership. 
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Bulgaria GDP By Expenditure (US$ millions)
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Figure.6:  Bulgaria Gross Domestic Product by expenditure (Data source: OECD) 
 
2.2 Historical Conclusions 
 
For Romania and Bulgaria, while it is apparent that their history and 
development as nation states are in no way similar, the very fact that both of 
these countries struggled with the full implementation of any form of lasting 
democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can help to explain the 
slow implementation of full multi-party democracy post-1989. Both countries 
emerged as nation states after years of belonging to larger and more 
oppressive empires with a genuine desire to try and define their place in the 
world system,. The importance of the failure of democracy, particularly in the 
1930’s, characterised by the instability of parliamentary coalitions, and in 
Romania’s case the rise of fascism, both of the monarchical kind, and by the 
emergence of a right-wing totalitarian system under the Iron Guard, made the 
implementation of the Soviet style of government that much easier after the 
end of WWII.   There is an argument to be made that by having no 
remembrance of a stable form of democracy in the country’s past, it is 
understandable that these two countries would find it difficult to implement a 
democratic system after the fall of communism in 1989. Moreover  when both 
of these countries were directly influenced by external and internal factors (as 
will be shown in the next chapter) both of these countries coming under the 
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rule of particularly harsh communist systems, the most important factor (more 
important that the democratic inexperience referred to earlier) can be seen to 
be  this harshness of leadership style, contributing to a complete failure of the 
economic system by 1989 and leading to the collapse of the leadership and the 
end of Communist Party rule. 
 
2.3 The Communist Legacy: Romanian and Bulgarian 
communism in contrast 
 
By examining the communist histories of both of these countries, and 
exploring the differences in each country’s systems, and economic, foreign 
and social policies of the governing authorities from 1945-1989 it is possible 
to see how the difference in these policies led directly to the observable 
differences in Romanian and Bulgarian transition from 1989.  A direct 
correlation has to be made about these two countries relationship with Western 
Europe (and the rest of the world) in this time period and the implications this 
relationship has to the transition from communism to multi-party democracy.  
This correlation can be used to explain both Romania and Bulgaria’s 
relationship with the European Community post 1989, as well as the actions of 
these two countries towards their goal of becoming Member States of the 
European Union. 
 
Communism as a system is not a catch-all phrase.  As can be seen below while 
both Romania and Bulgaria have been defined as communist-style states, the 
two countries leadership systems were dissimilar, as were their dealings with 
other nation states, and this was not uncommon when looking at the 
governance of all Eastern Bloc countries. 
 
The Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Român, PCR) was 
developed at the time of the October Revolution and the birth of the Soviet 
state, and had been underground from 1921-1944, but it really became a force 
for political action after a major land reform in 1921, which was implemented 
‘as a way of easing social tensions and reducing the shocking disparities 
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between classes’.42  The Party itself was run along strictly Bolshevik lines, and 
developed what Tismaneau has defined an ‘almost mystical sense of 
supranationality’.43  This was to have a distinct influence on the birth of the 
socialist state of Romania after WWII, and goes some way towards explaining 
the growth and popularity of a dictatorial style of communist leadership under 
both Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceauşescu.   
 
This was communism with a difference however.  The animosity felt towards 
Russia from earlier time periods did not decline after the declaration of 
Romania as a socialist state.  While Romania was placed in the Soviet sphere 
of influence under a combination of the ‘percentage agreements’, (defined by 
the WWII victors) and the external influence of Soviet occupation at the end 
of WWII and agitation from the Soviets inside Romania  it was not a true 
Soviet neophyte like Bulgaria.  Some level of animosity towards the Soviet 
Union was felt almost from the beginning of the Romanian communist 
leadership, especially when Soviet heavy handedness was felt through both 
foreign policy intervention, and economic dominance, particularly in regard to 
the high amounts of war reparations demanded by Russia.  While Romania 
adopted the Stalinist-style economic policies (the development of fast 
industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation), the first leader of the 
republic, Georghiu-Dej ‘was a Stalinist at home and a Titoist abroad’44  It was 
due to this leadership style that Romania developed an individual style of 
communism, in which the country participated fully in the Soviet economic 
system, but retained a degree of separateness and neutrality in matters of 
foreign policy, for example the Sino-Soviet dispute and the resumption of 
diplomatic relations with Albania. 
 
One of the major areas of differentiation in Romanian style communism from 
that of other Central and Eastern European communist states was in its 
economic and trade relationships, both with the Soviet Union, and with the 
rest of the world.  Unlike Bulgaria, as will be seen below, Romania resisted, 
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and invariably won, attempts by the Soviet Union to impose its economic 
plans on the country (these Comecon plans focusing on the integration of the 
communist states economies, relegating Romania to the status of supplier of 
oil and grains to the Soviet bloc). Attempts by Comecon to prevent Romania 
from industrialising managed to be overturned by Georghiu-Dej, who from 
1964 set Romania out on its own individual path.  This path included strong 
trade ties with Comecon, but did not limit the country  to just reliance on one 
trading partner, aggressively pursuing trading relations with Western Europe 
and other world powers, establishing ‘unofficial negotiations’ with Brussels in 
the late 1960’s and signing a cooperation agreement with the EEC in 1980.45   
 
After Georghiu-Dej’s death in 1965 his successor Nicolae Ceauşescu 
continued along this road of individual economic reform of the system, 
creating and refining the Romanian communist system even further.   
Ceauşescu as a leader managed to create a country in the Soviet sphere of 
influence that was independent of Moscow.  He was a skilled diplomat, mostly 
in the way that he managed to carefully balance Romanian trade relations with 
both the Soviet Bloc and the West, and in defiance of the Kremlin’s foreign 
policy, overseeing Romania receiving state visits from Western dignitaries, 
being granted favoured nation with the United States (1975) as well as having 
the privilege of joining both GATT (1971) and the IMF (1972).  By 1973 
47.3% of Romania’s trade was with Western nations, this incurring a large 
trade deficit that necessitated heavy borrowing from the West (US$159.1 
million to the IMF and US$1,502.8 million to the World Bank)46 Ceauşescu 
did however participate in a more traditional style of Stalinist leadership, using 
the leading role of the party to instigate policies of control relating to both 
social and political gain, namely the use of secret police to control elements of 
society opposed to the leader, and the use of population control in order to 
facilitate his grand vision of Romania as a  completely industrialised nation.  
As with other Eastern European states, by the 1970’s the Romanian economy 
had begun to take a downturn.  Instead of instigating economic reform, the 
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leader tried to finish his economic goals, borrowing huge sums of money from 
his allies in the West and instigating what Elster, Offee and Preuss have stated 
was ‘ …a historically unique policy of repaying its foreign debt at schedule at 
all cost which resulted in an exhaustion of the economy and a dramatic 
lowering of the populations living standards’47.  This lack of real reform was 
to have devastating consequences for Romania, both in the period before and 
directly after the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe, 
especially as ‘by the 1980’s the inability of the command economy to meet the 
needs of more advanced economies, compounded by an international 
environment of high energy prices and interest rates, had resulted in virtual 
stasis’48  This was the situation in Eastern Europe in general, but the 
Romanian leadership’s refusal to consider economic reform to offset the 
precarious economic situation was to have serious consequences leading into 
reform as a post-communist state.  
 
As a difference to the Romanian style of communism narrated above, the 
Bulgarian system can be characterised as one that complied strictly with the 
policies implemented by Moscow.  This can be seen to be of no surprise, 
considering the past history and strong ties that the two countries had shared 
during the previous century.   Berglund and Aarebrot define Bulgarian 
communism as having been implemented very quickly due to a combination 
of Soviet interference, pressure from below for reform and disinterest from 
both Great Britain and the United States49.  This can be seen as an accurate 
definition, especially taking into account Bulgaria’s strong and close 
relationship with the Soviet Union.   The first leaders Dimitrov and 
Chervenkov, led Bulgaria as a smaller version of Stalin’s leadership of the 
Soviet Union, implementing collectivisation and industrialisation directives 
without question.   In the beginning of communist rule, the centrally controlled 
Soviet command economy seemed well suited to Bulgaria, which was still 
primarily agricultural.  Heavy industrialisation helped to modernise the 
economy, especially during the after-math of both war and depression.   After 
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the 1954 destalinisation, and the appointment of Todor Zhivkov as First 
Secretary, there were some limited reforms made, but in essence Zhivkov 
must be seen as an ideological hardliner, creating Bulgaria as essentially a 
satellite state of the Soviet Union.  Unlike Romania, Bulgaria did not pursue 
an agenda independent of Moscow, especially in regards to foreign policy and 
trade, Bulgaria maintaining a strict anti-EEC stance50.   Goldman defines 
Bulgaria under Zhivkov as one of the most oppressive regimes in Eastern 
Europe, characterised by almost total state control over all aspects of the 
economy, as well as ruthless repression of any kind of dissent.51  Bulgaria’s 
closeness with the Soviet Union meant that not only did it not attempt any 
kind of real economic reform, even when it had become obvious that the 
Bulgarian economy could not sustain the level of industrialisation required by 
the Soviet Union, but it also supported the Soviet Unions policies regarding 
the retention of its control, especially in its dealings with both Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary, especially in relation to their attempts to implement some mild 
types of reform.  Bulgaria participated in the Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, in direct contrast to Romania which did not, with it being 
noted that  
‘the impact of Communism on Bulgarian society was much stronger  
than in the Czechoslovak case.  Bulgaria did not catch up with the 
industrialised world until communist rule and significantly improved 
its socio-economic position in that period’52 
 
Bulgarian communism went through a minor shift in policy from the mid 
1960’s, implementing only a moderate package of economic reforms, and in 
1971 it adopted both a new constitution and a new party program.  Bulgaria 
was the country that went furtherest in organising agriculture along industrial 
lines in Central and Eastern Europe, amalgamating its farms in the 1970’s into 
one hundred and fifty agro-technical complexes, which had to be dismantled 
after the fall of communism in the country.53   By the end of the 1970’s 
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Bulgaria was developing into a more controlled police state, whilst 
subservience to Moscow intensified, to the point where Zhivkov attempted to 
incorporate Bulgaria into the USSR.  This subservience damaged the country’s 
international standing, as unlike Romania, it was seen on the international 
stage as a firm Soviet satellite state.54  Analysis will show that this dependence 
on the Soviet Union was to be a large barrier to overcome after the collapse of 
the communist system in Bulgaria in 1989, particularly in regards to the 
Bulgarian economy which had been very dependant on the Soviet Comecon 
system. 
2.4      Romania, Bulgaria, the EU and the West 1945-1989   
 
As discussed earlier, Romania and Bulgaria existed under different styles of 
communist leadership.  Bulgaria exhibited all the signs of total subservience to 
the Soviet Union while for Romania, the leading role of the party, while utilising 
Soviet mechanisms for total state control, also followed its own independent 
leadership style in its relationship both with the Soviet Union and with the 
Western world.   
 
The Bulgarian commitment to the principles of the Soviet Union can be easily 
observed from the implementation of the first planned economy steps in 1947, 
eliminating private trading and creating in Bulgaria a heavy industrial base.  The 
Bulgarian leadership used the breach in relations between Stalin and Tito to the 
country’s advantage, arguing for stronger ties with the Soviet Union to ‘defend 
Bulgaria from Yugoslavia’s reckless and assertive leaders’55 helping to assist 
Bulgaria to receive excellent trading terms with the USSR in relation to natural 
resources as well as increasing the popularity of the Bulgaria leadership amongst 
the Bulgarian population.  Even with the Soviet bloc being the most important 
partner in terms of trade, in 1953 Chervenkov announced his wish to secure 
better relations with both Greece and the USA, and in 1955 he expressed a 
willingness to improve relations with Yugoslavia.  In 1959 diplomatic relations 
were resumed with the USA and in 1960 an agreement was signed with Canada 
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to import 100,000 tonnes of wheat per annum for three years (as a direct result 
of food shortages in the country).56   
 
While as can be seen, there were some small contacts with the West in these 
early stages of communist rule in Bulgaria, reliance on the USSR as a trading 
partner and provider of resources was paramount.  Bulgaria supported the USSR 
foreign policy position in relation to arms control and the Vietnam conflict, and 
in return for this the Soviet Union provided a secure market for goods that in the 
Western economies of the EEC and North America were considered poor 
quality.  Economic links with West Germany had been developing since the 
1950’s, with diplomatic relations being resumed with West Germany in 1973, as 
well as Japan in 1970. The development of further ties with the West were to 
stall in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s however due to Bulgarian involvement 
in a number of assassination attempts on Bulgarians in exile, the evasion of 
sanctions against South Africa and the belief that the Bulgarian export agency 
was involved with the smuggling of drugs, the profits of which used to purchase 
arms for subversive movements in central America, Turkey and Africa.57  A 
number of agreements concluded with western companies for the manufacture 
of their products under license with Bulgaria and an important ten-year trade 
deal with Germany were undermined due to US insistence that its trading 
partners observe US export controls that had been placed upon any export to 
communist states of any items which might assist the development of military 
programmes in these states.58  Even with an informal agreement with the EC 
regarding arrangements in agricultural products did not help with the 
development of trade ties with the West as the produce, while generally high 
quality, was not needed and was therefore discriminated against in the hard 
currency market of the EEC.59  With the countries of the West not being in a 
position to offer Bulgaria a viable alternative to the CMEA system, it is not 
surprising that from the 1970’s Bulgaria became more reliant on the Soviet 
Union as its dominant partner. 
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With Romania being seen in the West as being more liberal in matters of the 
economy (a perception carefully cultivated by Ceausescu), Soviet economic 
dominance was not as strong as can be seen with Bulgaria.  Romania actively 
pursued ties with the West, seeking not only trade but diplomatic linkages.  
Romania gained admission to the IMF and World Bank (as well as GATT) in 
the 1970’s as well as solidifying trade linkages with the West by setting up joint 
trading companies in number of Western European countries, as well as North 
America, Asia and Africa.  In 1980 an agreement between the EEC and 
Romania established a joint agreement between the Community and Romania 
on trade in industrialised products, this agreement subsequently being amended 
in 1983 to extend the list of products originating from Romania that had been 
liberalised at the Community level.60  Romania established diplomatic relations 
with West Germany in 1967, and after the visit to Romania by US President 
Nixon in 1969 relations with the US were slowly strengthened, culminating in 
the granting of favoured nation status in 1975.  As testimony to the Romanian 
leadership independent foreign policy, by 1989 Romania maintained diplomatic 
relations with 125 countries, the strongest ties being held with France, Britain 
and Italy (including a number of joint trading ventures).  These strong ties were 
weakened however from the 1980’s as Romania became subject to justified 
condemnation of human rights abuses in the country from Western powers who 
could no longer maintain warm relations with Romania based solely on its 
independence of policy from the Soviet Union, and ignore those parts of the 
country’s system that practised active oppression of the Romanian citizenry.   
 
Trading links with the West, while being important to Romania especially in 
regards to the lending of foreign currency and the importing of specialised 
goods to help with Ceausescu’s policy of industrialisation suffered due to the 
weakening of these ties in the 1980’s, causing rising debt levels in the country 
and the further impoverishment of Romanian citizens.  Even with strong trade 
links with the West, Romania still managed to find itself in a state of economic 
crisis in the late 1980’s like the other communist states in the region, the 
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independence of trade and foreign policy of Romania notwithstanding, Romania 
in 1989 was in a similar situation to all other ex-communist states. 
 
This chapter has gone some way in trying to define the relationship between the 
European Union and its two newest member states.  It is clear from the history 
recounted above that this cannot be considered a relationship of equals.  While 
there has been a perception that Eastern Europe in 1945 was completely shut out 
from the Western World until the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, it 
can be seen that while there was not an open and free connection between the 
two separated halves of Europe, neither was there complete non-contact between 
these two countries, as has been so often portrayed.  It is also necessary when 
trying to understand the power dynamic between these two countries, which is a 
very important factor for the upcoming chapters, to have an understanding of the 
theoretical ideas behind enlargement.  While theoretical knowledge may not 
directly relate to the analysis contained in the rest of this work, a basic 
knowledge of the theory will be a necessary part of the background for the 
subsequent chapters of this research, especially when it can be seen from the 
information above that a topic as complex as enlargement (when applied to 
Romania and Bulgaria) does not have one easily applicable theory to explain the 
process. It is especially necessary to note the theoretical importance of 
conditionality and leverage to the analysis contained in the next sections.  The 
other important part of this background information is an understanding of the 
accession process itself, as the next chapter deals more specifically with the 
economic and political development of these two countries since 1989.  
Knowledge of the accession process will help to explain how the transition 
process in Romania and Bulgaria was mirrored by the move towards accession 
in these two countries. 
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3. Theories of EU Enlargement 
 
This chapter is focused specifically on the theoretical framework of 
enlargement.  Due to the heavy literature base of this thesis, this chapter will 
draw heavily on theory to explain the relationship between the EU and Eastern 
Europe, in an attempt to try and understand the power dynamic of this 
relationship, and to draw some conclusions that will go in some way towards 
answering the research questions posed by this work.    Focusing specifically 
on the predominant theories of enlargement, this chapter is an attempt to 
understand the enlargement of the European Union, in the hope that this will 
explain the relationship between the European Union and its candidate 
countries. 
3.1 Theories of EU Enlargement and Romania and Bulgaria 
 
From 1989, the main desire expressed by both Romania and Bulgaria has been 
the ‘return to Europe’, in the form of joining the European Union. The 
implications of this desire when looking at the impacts of the post-communist 
transformation of these two countries cannot be marginalised.  
 
From the beginning of the European Union, one of the major concerns of all 
Member and potential Member States have been the ideas of integration and 
enlargement.  This can be seen to be especially true when applied to the issues 
surrounding the Union’s relationship with the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe from the end of WWII until the present day.  Contrary to some 
portrayals, relations between East and West were not totally non-existent from 
1945-1989, but consisted mostly of small trade flows, Romania being one of 
the obvious exceptions due to its relatively friendly relationship with the West, 
helped by patronage from France and its non-acquiesence to the Soviet Union. 
One of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome is that any European country can 
apply to join the Union, a provision that had a built in safeguard due to the 
division of Soviet and non-Soviet spheres.   
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Enlargement  has always been a part of the unique nature of Europe in the 20th 
Century, and while there was never any specific plan for Eastern Europe, 
Fuchs and Klingemann’s theory on Europe establishing for itself an identity of 
democratic community61 meant that after the collapse of communism Central 
and Eastern Europe could not be left behind.  This did not however mean that 
Europe was enthusiastic about gaining newer, and more economically 
challenged members, and Central and Eastern states were somewhat puzzled 
to find that they were not immediately taken into the European Community 
and given adequate assistance to rapidly overcome the disastrous economic 
situations that they were facing.62  Discussions about integration and 
enlargement proceeded a lot slower than the ex-communist countries wanted, 
there being a lack of understanding on why the process, which the Western 
member states were verbally positive about,  was taking so long in actuality. It 
wasn’t until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that Central and 
Eastern Europe were given an indication of the direction that Western Europe 
were taking in regards to these new states, especially in regard to supporting 
freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law, as well as a more 
formalised direction for accession negotiations, which were codified in the 
‘Copenhagen Criteria’ in 1993, membership criteria that needed to be met 
before a country could consider becoming part of the Union. These criteria 
were split into three defined areas, (stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union)63 and helped 
to guide potential member states towards enlargement by entailing what the 
country was expected to achieve before being granted Union membership.  
The Copenhagen Criteria were strengthened at the Essen Council Meeting of 
1994 which formalised increased market access, specialised technical 
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assistance in preparing for participation in the internal market and laid down 
guidelines to stimulate investment from the Union.64 
 
 
  This transition will be analysed in more detail in part four.  This section is 
more focused on,, firstly, theories of enlargement, before moving on to 
examine how these enlargement theories can be applied to the relationship 
between Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union, in some part to explain 
how the dynamic between these groups affected the transition in these 
countries. 
 
The  ‘return to Europe’ theory is the first theory to be addressed in this section, 
which can be explained as the post-communist states desire to rejoin what they 
considered their place in Europe after fifty years of being separated under 
communist rule and involved a rejection of the country’s  communist past and 
an attempt to recapture a sense of ‘pan-European connections’65  Van Ham 
states that ‘the absence of Eastern European members in the Council of 
Europe once more indicated that these countries, due to their communist 
domination, had disavowed the European ‘common heritage’ 66, giving to 
Europe and Eastern Europe an idea of common heritage that may go some 
way to explaining the idea of the ‘return to Europe’.  This theory is a very 
simplistic idea, and can be characterised as a ‘pull theory’ in which countries 
are pulled towards the ideal of being part of the developed area of Europe, 
with all the benefits that go with joining this union.  This is part of the 
constructivism argument of enlargement in which  
 
‘applicants and members ‘construct’ each other and their relationships         
on the ideas that define the community that the EU represents…. In 
other words, demand for integration follows from the degree to which 
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the actors inside and outside the EU share a collective identity and 
fundamental beliefs’67 
 
When examining motives of Central and Eastern states in relation to their 
position in Europe, return to Europe seems to be the predominately strong 
theory to help explain enlargement,  O’Brennan seeing it as ‘rooted in issues of 
identity, norms and values that drove the Eastern enlargement forward and 
proved decisive in determining its content and form’68. While the revolutions 
(both peaceful and violent) of 1989-90 proved to come from a variety of 
influencing factors, both from above and below, it can be seen that one of the 
driving reasons for this spectacular change was the chance for self-
determination free from external influence, even if however, almost straight 
away most central and eastern European states expressed a wish to ‘draw near 
to, or eventually become, a member of the European Union’69, another powerful 
external influence in the transition of these countries.   The history of these 
countries shows that the enforced soviet-style system only reinforced the desire 
for these countries to be recognised as Europe, and was probably one of the 
most important motivating factors for the collapse of the communist system and 
the subsequent fast-track reforms in most of these countries to multi-party 
democracy and economic transformation, with Smith discussing the role of the 
‘prospect of enlargement’ as a foreign policy goal of the EU to support the 
economic and political transformation in Eastern Europe, ensuring security and 
stability70 as a good example of this external influence.  
 
 However, while the theory of return to Europe needs to be considered in 
relation to Romanian and Bulgarian transition, it should not be linked to as the 
only explanation for these two countries to actively seek membership of the 
EU..    
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The concept of conditionality  (another concept that is part of the constructivism 
framework) is very important when looking at theories of enlargement, and 
Pridham believes that ‘the EU has come to be the most associated with 
democratic conditionality, since the eventual prize is no less than eventual 
membership for compliant new democracies’   The belief here is that because of 
its authority over the key aspects of enlargement, the European Commission 
could exert a ‘relentless pressure’ on candidate countries with conditionality all 
the more as failure to meet its stated conditions could affect their progress in 
accession.   Romania and Bulgaria are both good examples of this.  Developing 
a relationship with the European Union and with individual Member States was 
seen as the best way to break free of the artificial divide of Europe into East and 
West, ‘moving beyond communist legacies and regaining a full role in the 
European political and economic space’     
 
From the beginning the EU can be seen to have been slow to respond to the 
idea of Eastern enlargement, as many Member States were reluctant to commit 
themselves to the accession of post-communist enlargement.  By using 
conditionality and arguing that Central and Eastern Europe had to be ready to 
join, the EU Member States put emphasis on the applicants conforming to the 
EU, rather than the EU reforming to fit the new Members as a way to reassure 
Member States of EU control over enlargement. Fears of the consequences of 
enlargement also helped to encourage a conditionality approach based on 
reducing its social and economic impact by demanding full compliance by the 
applicants in advance of accession.   One of the negatives of this level of 
conditionality is that the close relationship between European policy aimed 
exclusively at accession and meeting democratic conditionality requirements 
is that it tended to dissuade policy makers in Central and Eastern Europe from 
considering independently the systemic effects for democratic consolidation in 
their countries.   It has also been necessary that in setting conditions for 
membership the EU has had to find a balance between giving support for 
reforming governments while not devaluing the status of EU membership by 
admitting countries that fail to meet its standards.    
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Conditionality belongs to the same theoretical framework as return to Europe, 
as by calling attention to identity changes by making candidate countries 
conform to ideals of European-ness through the tools of accession, this is a 
good example of constructivism.  This work subscribes to the constructivist 
school of international relations theory when examining the relationship 
between Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union.  A constructivist 
combination of the ideas of return to Europe and European Union 
conditionality is the best theoretical explanation of the relationship between 
Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union in post-communist Europe, in 
which transition in these two countries has been socially constructed through 
the tools of accession, capable of being transformed thorough human practice, 
which can be seen in the EU variation to the tools of accession for the newer 
candidate countries from the Balkans. 
 
Another enlargement theory is Vachudova’s examination of active and passive 
leverage in relation to the European Union’s attitude towards its enlargement 
into Central and Eastern Europe. Active and passive leverage is a variation of 
the constructivist conditionality approach discussed earlier. Vachudova’s 
central argument is that the EU took centre stage in relation to Central and 
Eastern Europe’s foreign policy goals, using both active and passive leverage 
as a way to force potential member states to conform to EU ideals.  
Vachudova singles out  
‘the EU’s passive leverage merely reinforced liberal strategies of 
reform in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while failing to 
avert, end or significantly diminish rent-seeking strategies for winning 
and exercising power in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia’71 
 
Vachudova takes a historical instrumentalist approach to the idea of active and 
passive leverage, in which, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, she examines 
how the EU used its influence on domestic political reforms in Eastern 
Europe, in which she characterises both of these countries as being subject to 
both forms of leverage during their transition period.   This is separated into 
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periods of active and passive leverage from the Union, helping to force along 
the transition at the Union’s pace. Vachudova defines passive leverage as ‘the 
traction that the EU has on the domestic politics of credible candidate states 
merely by virtue of its existence and its usual conduct’72 while direct leverage 
is characterised as ‘the deliberate policies of the EU towards the candidate 
state’73.  Vachudova singles out Romania and Bulgaria (as well as Slovakia) 
being characterised by the Commission as illiberal countries, in which the 
Commission applied direct active leverage (such as delaying accession dates 
or granting/cutting assistance) to change the political situation in these 
countries, by helping to put into place more reform-friendly and accession-
minded governments into power in these countries.   
 
Mayhew believes that ‘the whole of Europe wins from wider integration’74.  
The main argument of this work is that for Central and Eastern Europe, a 
chance to join the Union has meant for these candidate countries the 
opportunity to be part of a democratic union of nations for the first time, 
instead of being seen as ‘floating dangerously between East and West’75 while 
for the European Union there are gains politically from both the security point 
of view and in the economy, with the argument to be made that enlargement 
was necessary for the future survival of the Union.76   Much of Mayhew’s 
emphasis is on the security of the region, seeing the EU as being a necessary 
strong anchor for the implementation of the market economy and multi-party 
democracy to help the associate countries out of their weak security and 
economic situations.77  This is a mixture of realism, which emphasises the 
security guarantees that EU membership provides against possible attempts by 
Russia to reassert its influence, and liberal intergovernmentalism, which 
stresses economic gains through market access and investment flows.78  Much 
of Mayhew’s work focuses on the attraction of the European Community to 
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‘the people of Central and Eastern Europe, impoverished by years of central 
planning and deprived of democratic rights’.79 
 
Zielonka (2006) takes Mayhew’s emphasis on the security of the region as the 
central point of his research, presenting a strong argument that enlargement of 
the European Union is creating a neo-medieval empire in which enlargement 
is entered into increasingly on strategic grounds, as an effective foreign policy 
tool to ‘shape its unstable external environment.’80  Zielonka charts what he 
sees as ‘wonders’ in the transition of Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey 
using the policy of conditional admission to the Union as an effective tool 
both of conditionality and international leverage.81  Both Mayhew and 
Zielonka, focusing on EU security concerns in the region, must be taken into 
account when examining the enlargement of the Union post-1989, but are not 
to be seen as the only valid explanation for the fifth wave of enlargement in 
2007, security not being the primary concern of the EU in relation to the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
3.2 EU Enlargement Theories and the Accession of  Romania 
and Bulgaria  
 
The previous section has explored  a number of different theories in relation 
to the idea of enlargement theory, and it is now prudent to examine the 
applicability of these theories to try and understand the relationship between 
Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union.   
 
The first part of the previous sub-section dealt with theoretical concepts from 
the constructivist approach to enlargement, examining notions of ‘return to 
Europe’ and European conditionality and leverage.  While constructivism 
seems to be the dominant theoretical framework when examining enlargement 
theory, the idea of  return to Europe’ does not go far enough to be seen as the 
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only theoretical explanation of the relationship between Romania, Bulgaria 
and the EU.   
 
The European Union undoubtedly can be seen as the predominant actor in 
this region, and there would be no more compelling reason why Romania and 
Bulgaria would want to ally themselves with their more powerful neighbour.  
Past history plays an important role in the idea of returning to Europe.  As 
these two countries see themselves as part of Europe, denied the right to this 
heritage at the end of WWII, the concept of becoming part of Europe again is 
a strong driving force for enlargement. Jereb defines Romania as  
 
‘A geographical representation on the European map, Romania today 
is a creation of the Second World War, its borders redrawn both during 
and after the war.  As a political space, it is a new creation emerging 
from the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe’82   
  
While this is not strictly true, there being a definite sense of nationhood both 
pre- WWI and in the interwar years when applied to Romania, past history of 
this country can lead to explanation why the idea of Europe can been seen as a 
driving force in relation to this country’s quest for EU membership, and while 
O’Brennan rightly surmises that previously to WWII there existed many 
‘Europes’ and ‘at no one time could one identify a genuine collective 
governed by common rules and legal norms’83, Romania’s past history 
summarised in the first part of this work can help to give some understanding 
for the desire by the Romanian people to rejoin a system they felt that they had 
been held apart from by the Iron Curtain. 
 
The significance of return to Europe as a theory then cannot be discounted, 
especially in regards to Central Europe, which traditionally had strong ties to 
Western Europe, sharing a common religion with its Western counterparts, 
these ties perhaps being stronger for Central than Southern Europe who not 
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only shared religion but were also part of larger empires with their Western 
counterparts in earlier times, parts of Romania belonging to both the Ottoman 
and Austria-Hungary Empires while Bulgaria for a long period was under 
Ottoman rule (along with other territories such as Serbia, Greece and 
Hungary).   Bulgaria, with its close ties to Russia as her status of liberator in 
the nineteenth century,  can not be seen to be having a tradition of wanting a 
return to a Europe that traditionally there were only some small ties with, but 
the country expressed the same wish of membership as with other Central and 
Eastern countries of this time. This signals that there are other theories that 
could hold just as much importance when examining the power dynamic of the 
relationship between Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union, particularly 
in relation to transition. 
 
When examining the school of constructivist thought in relation to 
enlargement, the theory of conditionality can be seen as one of the most 
applicable theories in regards to an explanation of the relationship between 
Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union.  As explained earlier 
conditionality is where countries are foced to conform to ideas of European-
ness through the tools of accession.  One good example of this was the 
exclusion of Romania and Bulgaria from the first round of post-communist 
accession.  This sent a clear signal that the tools of accession, complying with 
the aquis, and adhering to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, 
(as adopted by the Copenhagen Council of 199384) were considered as the key 
stones of accession, and that under-performance or non compliance with these 
tools would have direct and lasting consequences for potential Member States.  
The theory of conditionality also ties into the idea of ‘return to Europe’ as 
Member States used accession as a measure of their own claims to be an 
accepted part of Europe. The goal of joining was not just based on a calculated 
motivation of receiving specific benefits, significantly trade and aid, but as a 
way of becoming ‘modern and civilised’85  Conditionality then was used by 
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post-communist governments to use EU driven reforms as a way to overcome 
resistance from interest groups. 
 
Transition in Romania and Bulgaria was mostly determined by conditionality.  
While transition in these two countries was practically non-existent to begin 
with, the idea of the return to Europe was so powerful that European Union 
membership was a goal from the very collapse of the communist system (at least 
on paper for ex-communist states), Bulgaria’s transition stagnated from 1989-
1996 due to the lack of implementation of any true reform, leading to a state of 
political and economic crisis by 1996.  Conditionality from the European Union, 
mostly through its accession criteria, meant that there was a clear roadmap of 
reform that could be followed, and the early elections in Romania and Bulgaria 
in 1996 - 1997 focused on which party could guarantee European Union 
membership the fastest by following this guide. By agreeing to conditionality 
clearly delineated from the EU Romania and Bulgaria would gain the political 
benefits of membership, including being part of an organisation which ‘has the 
political and economic weight to enter international negotiations as one of three 
powerful trade blocs’ 86 The European Union did use conditionality however to 
pressure both of these candidate countries to make specific changes to remedy 
the most pressing problems that had kept them outside of the first wave on 
enlargement, including Bulgaria needing to set a date for the closure of the 
Kozloduy nuclear power plant, whilst Romania had to reform its state childcare 
program and improve its macroeconomic situation.87    This form of pressure 
(referred to as leverage) can be seen as another off-shoot of the constructivism 
argument, in which conditionality is used as leverage against candidate countries 
such as Romania and Bulgaria, and can be seen as applicable when examing the 
relationship between these parties. 
 
When examining the importance of leverage as part of the theoretical framework 
of enlargement, it is possible to highlight this importance with a number of 
examples. 
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The consequences for Romania and Bulgaria in the failure on the Union’s part to 
apply more direct active leverage in the early stages of transition meant that 
what Vachudova terms as illiberal parties were able to control the reform and 
transition of these two countries on their own terms resulting in a very low rate 
of actual reform until the mid 1990’s.  By maintaining power in the hands of ex-
communist leaders, both in Romania and Bulgaria, these leaders were able to 
pay lip-service to the ideas of reform and transition, while maintaining their own 
agendas, not losing their popularity by subjecting the countries to the much 
more radical approach to transition, which as discussed earlier does impact in 
the short term on living standards, but has significant benefits for the population 
in the long term. Those ex-communist states that did take a more radical  
approach to transition, such as Poland and Hungary, had both a much more 
successful relationship with the European Union, and achieved a much higher 
level of reform much earlier than their counterparts which did not take this 
approach.  Once leverage and conditionality were applied to these governments, 
one of the direct consequences of leverage that can be quantified is the removal 
of these governments in 1996-7, with their replacements being pro-reform and 
pro-EU accession.  In the early years of transition, Romania was ‘able to 
conclude major agreements with the European Union, the Council of Europe 
and NATO despite few improvements to its democratic standards and its 
protection of minority rights’88, a good example of the position of Vachudova 
that it was only through active leverage (using the tools of conditionality 
established by the Commission) that real and lasting reform can be achieved. 
 
Once active leverage was applied to both Romania and Bulgaria, by making 
threats of exclusion such as denying them the pre-accession process, and in later 
times  the decision to keep  these two countries out of the first wave of 
enlargement, one can start to see just how influential the Union can be on 
recalcitrant countries.  When a more active form of leverage was applied by the 
Union to both Romania and Bulgaria, and coupling this with the economic crises 
in 1996-7,  the combination of these factors led directly to a change of 
leadership in both countries and the implementation of true and lasting reform in 
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these two countries, with the leadership not only actively promoting the idea of 
joining the EU, but actually implementing change designed directly to ensure 
membership.  Active and passive leverage (as with conditionality)  loses 
momentum when a country reaches full member status and this concept will be 
examined more closely in a later part of this work, but when measuring EU 
impact on countries in transition the importance of active and passive leverage 
cannot be denied.  Without European Union influence using these two forms of 
leverage it is a possibility that both Romania and Bulgaria would not have 
achieved such substantial political and institutional change in a relatively short 
time period as they did from 1997 to the accession in 2007.  Regarding how 
passive and active leverage have affected the relationship between the EU, 
Romania and Bulgaria it can be seen that this was strategy was probably one of 
the most important factors when assessing how this relationship developed.  It 
can be seen that active leverage can be classified as one of the more applicable 
theoretical approaches for the situation of Romania and Bulgaria, especially 
after 1996-7 as it was after this time period that a relationship(between the EU 
and Romania and Bulgaria) that had fundamentally the same goals was 
developed, and it was through this strengthened relationship with clear 
conditionality guidelines that Romania and Bulgaria began to implement a much 
more structured and successful transition regime. 
 
 
 The realist and liberal intergovermentalist schools of enlargement theory must 
not be discounted when examining the relationship between Romania, Bulgaria 
and the European Union.  Mayhew’s idea that wider integration benefits the 
whole of Europe, especially in the security and economic sense is a  good 
example of this theoretical framework and there can be seen to be  an element of 
this when examining the relationship between Romania, Bulgaria and the EU.   
As discussed previously, the stated goals (at least on paper) of post-communist 
governments in both of these countries was the goal of European Union 
membership, and the liberalisation of market entry was among the first reform 
steps of all Central and Eastern European countries, with the market already 
having been partially liberalised in Bulgaria during the economic reforms of the 
1980’s.  As prices were further liberalised in Bulgaria at the beginning of 1991 
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this resulted in severe price shocks, leading to a public outcry and the 
reimposition of price controls.89  This can be seen to have been used as an 
excuse for the government to implement no real reforms, preferring to maintain 
power by keeping the population content.  
 
While aid is important to countries in transition, the key to successful transition 
rely on ‘macroeconomic and microeconomic policies applied by governments 
and the development of trade and other economic relations with the West’90  
Romania and Bulgaria’s failure to effectively implement these policies led 
directly to the crisis situation of 1996-1997, and it is only with the certainty 
provided by accession that there will be a positive influence both in domestic 
and foreign investment.  This can be seen when examining the situation in 
Romania and Bulgaria once these countries had started actively pursuing EU 
membership, in which Mayhew’s theory realist of integration benefitting Europe 
in an economic sense only really start to come to pass in Romania and Bulgaria 
when they had acceded to European Union conditionality, especially in 
economic reform. 
 
In conclusion, much has been written on the theories of enlargement, and it is 
clear from the information gathered above that there is no one clear way to 
categorise enlargement in relation to either Eastern Europe in general, or 
Romania and Bulgaria in specific.  It is perhaps more accurate to understand that 
enlargement is not a straight linear process when related to Central and Eastern 
Europe after the fall of the Soviet regime, but rather a process that developed 
more as finding a solution for the ex-communist countries desire to rejoin 
Europe, and enlargement for those countries concerned developed in a different 
way according to how they transitioned.  The theory of return to Europe is 
important in that it characterises the primary goal of all Central and Eastern ex-
communist states directly after the fall of the communist system in 1989.  Smith, 
Zielonka and Mayhew all agree that enlargement must be seen as a foreign 
policy goal, ensuring security and stability is also important when examining the 
situation of Romania and Bulgaria.  However it is the ideas of conditionality and 
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leverage that provide the most cohesive framework in the understanding of 
transition of Romania and Bulgaria, and these theories will be the most 
important when examining the nature of transition in this work. 
 
Romania and Bulgaria both having emerged from the communist system, albeit 
in different ways, managed to follow the same path in their first steps to 
democracy.  While insisting that the top priority for these countries was to join 
the European Union, the steps taken by these two states belied this intention.  
Instead of following other Central and Eastern states in the area by 
implementing true reform, which consists of a radical approach to political and 
economic transition, which while causing temporary hardship to the population, 
results in a quicker and more transparent transition, Romania and Bulgaria’s 
transformation was, in the first half of the 1990’s,  more cosmetic than actual as 
will be seen in the following section of this work.
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4. Romania and Bulgaria: Post Communist Transition and 
Accession to the EU 
 
After examining the theoretical background to enlargement, and the relationship 
between the EU, Bulgaria and Romania in the communist period, it is now 
pertinent to examine the transition and accession processes of Romania and 
Bulgaria, to understand the necessary steps that these two countries took to 
become a part of the European Union in 2007.  The first part of this section 
gives a general overview of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, 
before a more detailed analysis, split into two distinct periods (fake transition 
1989-1997 and real transition 1997-2007), which is contained in the latter part 
of this section, before moving into chapter five, which details the situation in 
Romania and Bulgaria post-accession and discusses implications for future 
enlargement of the European Union. 
 
4.1 Accession to the EU 
 
Romania and Bulgaria emerged from the Soviet system in different ways, but 
from the beginning of the transition from communism both of these countries 
were treated in a similar way in relation to the accession process.  As Central 
and Eastern Europe started to move away from its communist leadership, the 
Romanian leadership was the only leadership that seemed prepared to resist 
change.  Once Romanians in the west of the country had access to Hungarian 
and Yugoslavian television, reporting on the downfall of Soviet-style regimes 
and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Romania became the only country in the 
communist system to respond with a full scale insurrection, resulting in a violent 
overthrow of the regime and the execution of their leaders in December 1989.91  
In contrast to this, Bulgarian opposition forces removed Todor Zhivkov, the 
leader of the country, peacefully in 1989, and in February 1990 the communist 
party voluntarily recused itself from power, paving the way for free elections. 
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Romania and Bulgaria are both examples of the power of the leading role of the 
party which had led Central and Eastern Europe since WWII.  While both 
countries had removed the dictatorships that had ruled for decades, the 
infrastructure of the party was still very much in evidence, and this can be 
shown to be directly related to the first free elections to be held in these two 
countries.  Due to time constraints and the fact that the ex-communist regimes 
were highly organised, controlling all infrastructure and media outlets, it is 
really no surprise that in the first round of free elections in both Romania and 
Bulgaria, newly established political parties consisting of ex-communist leaders 
retained power under their newly established ‘democratic’ party name.  While it 
is true that both of these countries reconstructed communist parties ran for 
election under a platform of ‘return to Europe’ as being the goal of the newly 
established parties, it is clearly seen that old communist ideas died hard in these 
countries, both leading parties implementing only very basic reform, preferring 
instead to retain the same level of power previously held under the communist 
system.  One of the most utilised ways to maintain power and popularity was not 
to implement a regime of either shock therapy or gradualist reform as in other 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but rather to take the path of effectively 
non existent reform, which was to have disastrous consequences for these 
countries in 1996-7.  Both countries used this strategy to good effect in the early 
part of the 1990’s, openly declaring their desire to rejoin Europe, but not 
implementing the steps necessary to make this a reality. 
 
One of the major provisions of the Treaty of Rome (1957) is that any European 
country may apply to join the European Union, and this was a key foreign policy 
aim of both Romania and Bulgaria after the fall of the communist regimes in 
these two countries.  The first phase of the EU’s eastern accession policy from 
1989-1993 was based around trade and aid, culminating in the development of 
the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies) 
programme in 1989, as an aid programme intended to support post-communist 
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transition in Central and Eastern Europe.92  PHARE funds focus entirely on the 
pre-accession priorities highlighted in the Road Maps and the Accession 
Partnerships which establish the overall priorities the country must address to 
prepare for accession and the resources available to help them do so93. Financial 
and technical assistance was seen as a necessary first step for Central and 
Eastern Europe, especially in regards to the modernisation of these countries.  In 
July 1990 the PHARE programme was extended to include Bulgaria but not 
Romania who was judged not ready due to student repression by the newly 
formed democratic government.  This was altered in 1991, when Romania was 
welcomed into PHARE and ratified its Trade and Cooperation Agreement with 
the EC.   From 1991 potential Member States were offered bilateral Europe 
Agreements, which made specific policy demands in Central and Eastern 
Europe through chapters on trade, competition policy, free movement of 
workers and on establishment and supply of services.94   
 
In both Romania and Bulgaria, the first post-communist governments attempted 
to suppress political competition and to subvert the newly developing 
democratic institutions.  Ethnic nationalism was used to build legitimacy and 
only episodic market reforms were launched.95   
 
In the case of both Romania and Bulgaria, which has already been mentioned 
previously, fears of economic reform allowed reconstructed communists to stay 
in power, using this fear of economic reform and the defence of the nation (from 
its ‘enemies’) to maintain their political power.  Political power was 
consolidated in the hands of both the FSN (Romania) and BSP (Bulgaria) 
governments.  In this first period of transition, political opposition to these two 
governments was almost non-existent, due to the ruling parties complete 
domination of the political landscape, using their positions as previous leaders 
of the country to undermine potential competition parties, utilising policies of 
partial economic reform to protect their ruling interests. The BSP used a skilful 
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combination of Bulgarian economic reforms from 1989 (especially in regards to 
privatisation, banking reform and foreign direct investment) that were almost 
non existent, and between 1989-1996 the country’s political life was dominated 
by economic problems under a succession of governments led by the BSP.96  
For an excellent comparison of the differences between a country led by 
reconstructed communists and a country led by a pro-reform government, 
charting the comparison in foreign direct investment for two countries in 
transition, Bulgaria and Poland, please see the figure below. 
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Figure 7 FDI in Comparison – Bulgaria and Poland 1991-7 (Data source: Lavigne97) 
 
Alan Smith defines Romania as having ‘arguably inherited the worst starting 
conditions for implementing the transition to a market economy outside the 
former Soviet Union’98  As mentioned earlier,  the Ceausesçu government’s 
economic policies had left Romania on the verge of economic collapse in 1989.  
From 1990 – 1994 the Romanian economy can be characterised as ‘something 
like a hybrid: neither fully marketised nor centrally planned’99, and this is a 
reflection of the Iliescu governments economic policy aimed to ensure his 
party’s popularity by not following other Central European countries who 
implemented major economic restructuring, leading to the situation in which 
Romania again reached the verge of economic collapse in 1996.  To illustrate 
                                                 
96
 Grabbe, p 109 
97
 Lavigne p 255 
98
 Alan Smith “The Romanian Economy Since 1989” in The EU and Romania: Accession and Beyond, 
D Phinnemore (ed) (London : Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2006,),  p 29 
99
 Ibid, p 29 
 54 
the importance of this point, the graph below shows a comparison of Romania’s 
percentage average rate of change in GDP, with that of Poland who 
implemented from 1989 a more radical approach to economic reform, with more 
successful results in a quicker timeframe. 
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Figure. 8 Romania and Poland GDP Percentage Change 1989-1996. (Data source: Lavigne100) 
 
One of the most important elements in the EU response to enlargement was the 
signing of the Europe Agreements with each individual candidate country.  This 
was an established legal framework for economic, commercial and human 
contacts between the EU and the ex-communist states. 101  By April 1992, the 
Commission proposed that the Europe Agreements contain a clause making 
them conditional on respect for human rights, democratic principles, the 
principles of market economy and also respect for the rights of minorities, a 
clear indication that Romania and Bulgaria did not fully meet this newly 
established criteria for a Europe Agreement.102  Europe Agreements were 
finalised with Romania103 and Bulgaria104 with Ingham hypothesising that the 
finalising of these agreements had little to do with the internal developments of 
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these countries, but an emerging consensus in the West that ties should be 
strengthened due to the developing crisis in Yugoslavia.105  The signing of 
Europe Agreements does not imply that Romania and Bulgaria were in fact 
proceeding apace with transition, with Ingham showing that the Romanian 
government seemed more concerned with both domestic affairs and foreign 
policy that was more concerned with both perceived threats from Hungary and 
the reestablishment of positive relations between Romania and the Soviet 
Union.106 
 
The first step towards accession came for Romania in 1993, with the signing 
of the Europe Agreement with the EU.   This agreement signalled a formal 
agreement between Romania and the EU to liberalise trade and to promote 
economic and financial cooperation between the two countries.107 
 
Europe Agreements and the development of PHARE were only the first in a 
number of conditionality measures that the European Union implemented in 
order to shape and control enlargement of the Union.  The 1993 Copenhagen 
European Council acknowledged with the adoption of the “Copenhagen 
Criteria” that enlargement was a matter of when and not if.  The Council 
established membership criteria that needed to be met before a country could 
consider becoming part of the Union. These criteria were split into three 
defined areas, (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence 
of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take 
on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic & monetary union)108 and helped to guide potential 
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member states towards enlargement by entailing what the country was 
expected to achieve before being granted Union membership.   
Romania’s bilateral Europe Agreement took effect in 1995, and replaced older 
trade agreements from the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, while for Bulgaria, the 
signing and implementation of her Europe Agreement (at the same time)  was 
the first step of independence towards Europe and away from her Russian-
focused past.   Following the Luxembourg Council’s decision in 1997 (which 
increased pre-accession aid and developed a new tool for enlargement : the 
Accession Partnership)109, the European Union agreed on a strategy for 
enlargement and it was from this point that formal accession negotiations were 
opened with Central and Eastern countries including Romania and Bulgaria, this 
being codified in 1999 with the Commission recommending that formal 
accession negotiations be opened with Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania. 
Slovakia and Malta.  This came after the so-called first wave of accession 
negotiations were opened with the ‘Luxembourg Six’ (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus) in 1998.  These second wave candidates 
had, with the exception of Slovakia, met the political criteria to start the 
accession process but were considered some way off meeting the economic 
criteria of membership.  In February 2000 negotiations were launched with the 
‘Helsinki Six’ (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia).   
 
For Central and Eastern European countries these negotiations are a difficult 
process.  The candidate country must first go through a rigorous screening 
process before negotiations are opened with the country on each chapter of the 
acquis communautaire, a conditionality tool consisting of legislative chapters 
which hold in them the total body of EU law.  Each candidate country must 
adopt, implement and enforce all the acquis and set up the necessary bodies 
(administrative and judicial) to oversee the legislation before being able to join 
the EU.   Fig 9. shows the chapters of the acquis that had to be completed by 
both the Luxembourg and Helsinki Sixes before being able to conclude 
accession negotiations with the European Union. 
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1. Free movement of goods 2. Free movement of persons 
3. Freedom to provide services 4. Free movement of capital 
5. Company law 6. Competition policy 
7. Agriculture 8. Fisheries 
9. Transport policy 10. Taxation 
11. Economic and Monetary Union 12. Statistics 
13. Social policy and employment 14. Energy 
15. Industrial policy 16. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
17. Science and research 18. Education and training 
19. Telecommunication and 
information technologies 
20. Culture and audio-visual policy 
21. Regional policy and coordination 
of structural instruments 
22. Environment 
23. Consumers and health protection 24. Cooperation in the field of Justice 
and Home Affairs 
25. Customs union 26. External relations 
27. Common Foreign and Security 
Policy 
28. Financial control 
29. Financial and budgetary provisions 30. Institutions 
31. Others  
 
Figure 9 Acquis Communautaire Chapters, (source: European Commission110) 
 
 
Once these chapters have been closed then a draft accession treaty is submitted 
to the Council for approval and the European Parliament for assent.  After the 
treaty has passed this stage then it is sent to the Member States and candidate 
states for ratification.  Figure 8 below illustrates the accession process for 
candidate countries to become members of the European Union. 
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Figure 10: Accession Process for Candidate Countries to the EU 
 
 
For the accession of  Romania and Bulgaria, Orban has characterised the process 
as ‘the biggest challenge after the Second World War’111  One of the first 
disappointments that these two countries suffered was to be split from the more 
progressive and reform-minded countries in Central and Eastern Europe into the 
second wave accession group.  This was a direct consequence of the slow pace 
of reform in these two countries resulting in a lack of economic readiness for 
accession.  For Romania especially this was bitterly contested, the Foreign 
Minister arguing 
 
‘ to separate the applicant countries into two groups for the opening of 
negotiations is counterproductive, creating artificial and discriminatory 
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frontiers, contrary to the principle of continuity of the process of 
enlargement of the EU; this method would penalise Romania, and 
could influence public opinion negatively and slow down the pace of 
economic reform’112 
 
whereas Bulgaria’s reaction was much less vitriolic, acknowledging only that 
much time had been wasted due to lack of reforms.113  While the Commission 
was correct in its judgement on this account, neither Romania or Bulgaria at this 
stage being close to be the ideal of a candidate country, the Romanian Foreign 
Ministers argument that the separation of applicant countries would influence 
and slow the pace of economic reform will be seen in later sections to be 
incorrect, as the judgement of the Opinion actually actively worked to stimulate 
reform in these two countries, as they strived to catch up to their counterparts 
and join the EU. 
 
From 2000-2002 Romania and Bulgaria struggled to fulfil the open and close 
the chapters needed to be considered as having fulfilled the necessary accession 
criteria.  Frequent monitoring reports detailed the progress (or lack of) for these 
two countries, culminating in 2002 in the Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania 
[COM(2002)624] which were aimed at helping both countries meet these 
criteria, and setting an accession goal of 2007.  This is a good example of EU 
active leverage.  By giving these countries a confirmed accession goal date, with 
a veto clause that this may be delayed by a year if satisfactory progress was not 
implemented, a policy of active leverage against these two countries was 
applied, proving a forceful motivator for Romania and Bulgaria to move up their 
reform efforts to meet the expected accession targets.  The Roadmaps for 
Bulgaria and Romania concentrated on administrative and judicial capacities 
and economic reform as well as the chapters of the acquis, showing that the 
Commission would support these reforms through the PHARE programme.  The 
only differences in the roadmaps for these countries were that the Roadmap for 
Bulgaria placed more emphasis on the economic reform of the privatisation 
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programme and the development of small to medium businesses, whilst for 
Romania the emphasis was placed on the rate of inflation, tax reform and 
budgetary reform.114 
 
Once the Roadmaps for Romania and Bulgaria had been issued, the progress of 
opening and closing accession chapters began in earnest.   The 2004 monitoring 
reports on Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia [COM(2004) 657 final] introduced for 
the first time a favourable report on the progress the two countries had made, 
especially in regards to the satisfying the Copenhagen political criteria and 
fulfilling the necessary conditions for establishing a viable market economy, an 
incredible change in circumstances from the economic crises of 1996-7.  By 
2004 Bulgaria had provisionally closed all chapters and Romania only had three 
to finish, so in light of this work began on drawing up Accession Treaty’s for 
both of these countries in July 2004, and a pre accession strategy was put in 
place.  Over the following three years Romania and Bulgaria successfully 
implemented all requirements covered in the Accession Treaty, resulting in the 
gaining of membership into the European Union on the 1st January 2007, and 
this implementation of requirements will be fully addressed and analysed in the 
next two sections of this work, a more complete analysis of economic and 
political transition in Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
4.2 Fake Transition 1989-1997 
 
‘The new governments of Eastern Europe were committed to the 
market economy and all of them expressed a wish to draw near to, or 
eventually become, a member of the European Union’115 
 
The statement above probably is the most accurate description of the situation in 
Eastern Europe in 1989.  However, for true transition to occur, a commitment to 
establishing the market economy, the implementing of multi-part democracy 
and institutional reform is not enough.  There must be a conscious decision to 
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actively pursue this commitment, even though in the short-term it may make 
conditions in the country concerned unpleasant for a short time.   This approach 
to reform, in either form, either  as ‘shock therapy’ or the more gradualist 
approach,  is the most successful path to transition, and those Central and 
Eastern European countries that implemented this were rewarded with 
membership status to the EU in 2004, as a result of their rapid and mostly 
successful transition. 
 
This section does not focus on these success stories however, but is more 
concerned with two countries that did not implement the either shock therapy or 
the slower, gradualist  approach to transition, Romania and Bulgaria.  This 
section focuses on the timeline of transition in Romania and Bulgaria, from 
1989 onwards, outlining key economic and political events, governmental and 
institutional change and judicial reform, to show how effective overall transition 
was in these two countries.  Special care will be taken to analyse the attitude of 
both of these countries to transition in general, with the chronological approach 
showing how transparent the reform process has been.  By showing the 
governments’ attitude to reform, an accurate gauge can be drawn on the desire 
for real reform in these countries, and by analysing the governments’ attitude to 
reform it should make the governments’ attitudes to EU accession clear, 
showing how important this is to the transition of these two countries. The next 
part of this chapter is focused from the events of 1996-7 in Romania and 
Bulgaria as these can be seen as the years when the reform process changed 
significantly and marks the turning point in the transition of these two countries, 
enabling them to become Member States in 2007, while the last part of the 
chapter focuses on the real transformation period for Romania and Bulgaria 
1997-2007. 
 
Even though Romania and Bulgaria emerged from communist rule in different 
ways, their situation in 1989 was remarkably similar.  Democratic elections 
were organised for the first time, with countries returning to power ex-
communist leaders who had rebranded themselves as fully democratic after the 
collapse of the regime. 
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The fall of the communist system in Romania in 1989 was characterised by the 
violent overthrow of the Ceausescu leadership, and the execution of the leader.  
Top communist lieutenant Ion Iliescu quickly formed The Council of the 
National Salvation Front, (FSN) who moved quickly to incorporate the 
revolution into his new nominally democratic party programme, executing the 
Ceausescu’s  and declaring his party as the new power in the country.  Multi-
party elections were hastily organised in light of the situation in Central and 
Eastern Europe, however mitigating factors in the country such as a lack of 
skilled intellectual opposition to the FSN (due in some regard to the ruthless 
suppression of this group by the Ceausescu regime) and the fact that Iliescu 
made the conscious decision to keep most of the state-controlled apparatus of 
the Ceausescu regime intact meant that the first election results (1990), in which 
Iliescu returned 85% of the vote for the FSN can been seen as a fait accompli 
when there could be no conceivable way that any other political opponenent to 
the FSN could launch an effective opposition campaign.116  By maintaining 
control of the state-run television and a number of news outlets, and effectively 
filling influential positions with former communist nomenklatura, Iliescu and 
the FSN made it virtually impossible for an effective opposition movement to 
mobilise.117   
 
While the FSN government had as part of their election platform the desire to 
rejoin Europe (a common theme amongst all post-communist governments in 
1989-1990), the actual priority of the FSN and the appointed nomenklatura was 
to maintain their influence in their country and in some cases to exploit the 
country (pocketing money from the state budgets and corrupting the 
privatisation process for personal gain) meaning that any real attempts to reform 
the country sufficiently at this stage to be in a position to rejoin Europe were at 
best an election slogan, and not an actual reality.  With the European Union 
scrambling to keep ahead of events in Central and Eastern Europe and to design 
and implement a cohesive enlargement policy for these new post-communist 
states, Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman embarked on a programme of 
partial economic reform, including the first privatisation law, which came into 
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effect in September 1991, using a mass voucher programme in order to privatise 
large state owned enterprises, as well as the enactment of Romanian Company 
Law 31/1990 which placed emphasis on the organisation of companies in 
Romania including clauses regarding formation of business organisations, 
dissolution and mergers of companies, liquidation and administration118 , while 
Law 33/1991 was passed outlining banking activity in the country.   The 
Constitution of Romania119 was adopted on 21 November 1991, outlining 
general principles, fundamental rights, freedoms and duties, public authorities, 
economy and public finances and the judicial system.  In response to the rapid 
change in the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU removed long-
standing import quotas, granted trade preferences and concluded trade and 
cooperation agreements with these countries, Romania signing her agreement in 
1991.  Financial support was offered to the newly democratic states through the 
PHARE programme (established 1989) to assist in the reform and rebuilding of 
these countries economy. Romania felt the first waves of disapproval from the 
European Union concerning its reform process when the country’s access to 
PHARE funds was delayed until the signing of the Trade and Co-operation 
Agreement in 1991 in response to Romania acceding to the EU’s conditionality, 
namely the halting of suppression of a number of pro-democracy protests by the 
government (utilising armed miners in Bucharest).  PHARE aid to Romania was 
delayed until January 30 1991 after EU member states debated the merits of 
suspending negotiation on the Trade and Cooperation agreement altogether due 
to this suppression, with Member States recognising that that to suspend these 
negotiations could result in jeopardising the democratic process in Romania 
rather than encouraging it.120   
 
Even with the extending of PHARE aid and the signing of the Trade and 
Cooperation agreement, it can be clearly seen that the democratic situation in 
Romania had not improved, but rather the Agreements were signed more as a 
signal that Romania should continue with reform process with EU support,  and 
not create a situation where the Romanian government would have an incentive 
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to stop reforms completely.  While other former communist states were 
negotiating Europe Agreements with the EU (a formal association agreement, 
one of the first stages in consideration for member state status) the negotiations 
with Romania were once again delayed due to another round of pro-democracy 
suppression in September 1991.   
 
The 1992 elections returned an election victory for the newly formed 
Democratic National Salvation Front (DFSN) an offshoot of the FSN who were 
still led by ex-communist nomenklatura including Iliescu, and who successfully 
campaigned on a platform of nationalism, defending Romania from the 
allegedly successionist Hungarian Alliance Party.121   When negotiations for the 
Europe Agreement were restarted again in 1992, and concluded in 1993 a new 
clause was added making the agreement conditional on respect for human rights, 
democratic principles, the principles of the market economy and also respects 
for the rights of minorities122.  This is a clear example of EU conditionality, 
acknowledging to Romania that the Europe Agreement was contingent on clear 
and transparent continued reforms on the specific criteria delineated in the 
Agreement.   
 
By 1993 the DFSN Party had merged with a number of smaller parties, 
renaming itself as the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) with 
Iliescu still as the leader.  The PDSR maintained its nationalist stance, especially 
when there could be seen to be a growing credible opposition by reform minded 
opponents.  While this can be seen to be a clear violation of the Europe 
Agreement (in respect to democratic principles), for Iliescu playing the 
nationalist card was one way to justify a less than fully implemented democratic 
process, showing himself to be the protector of Romania interests for the 
Romanian people. By 1993 Romania had become a member of the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) as well as gaining membership to the Council of 
Europe (after the imposition of significant delays due to the lack of freedom of 
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press, the state of minority rights, the security services and rule of law in 
Romania123), membership of these bodies being two key steps towards 
acceptance by Western Europe. The acceptance of Romania to the Council of 
Europe went some way to legitimising Iliescu’s rule in Romania, The Council of 
Europe decision signalling to Europe that the Iliescu government was one that 
could be accepted by the EU. 124    
 
The European Council in Copenhagen (1993) had agreed on a firm strategy 
concerning enlargement to the East, defining the economic and political criteria 
that had to be fulfilled for accession to the Union.  In using the Copenhagen 
Criteria to examine the situation in Romania it can be stated that Romania in 
1993-4 was lagging behind other Central European states in preparedness to 
become a member of the EU.  The conditions set out by the EU in 1993 were 
designed to minimise the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and 
economically burdensome on the existing EU125, but Romania with its revolving 
door of minority coalition governments and stagnating economic reform, 
designed to maintain governmental power by limiting necessary but short-term 
economic hardship in the country (which in the long-term benefits the economic 
situation as can be seen in other Central and Eastern states), was clearly not a 
viable candidate under the Copenhagen criteria in 1993-4.  
 
 
 In the spring of 1994 the first formal applications for EU membership by 
Central and Eastern European states were made.  Vachudova acknowledges that 
with the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria the first steps towards active 
leverage can be observed throughout Eastern Europe, as until 1994 the EU had 
minimal effect on domestic political change, but with the Copenhagen criteria 
signalling the development of a more concrete membership strategy, this can be 
seen as a significant change in governance and compliance for ex-communist 
states.126  The Essen Summit 1994 was instrumental in establishing the broad 
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terms of pre-accession strategy for potential candidate countries127  Essen 
formalised increased market access, specialised technical assistance in preparing 
for participation in the internal market and laid down guidelines to stimulate 
investment from the Union.128  A ‘pre-accession blueprint’ was to be drawn up 
for the Visegrad states and Romania and Bulgaria by Spring 1995, signalling to 
these countries that the EU was serious about establishing a clear dialogue 
regarding accession to the Union.129  The Romanian government continued with 
on-paper reforms in 1994 establishing a securities and exchange commission, 
however small and large scale privatisation remained elusive, three years after 
the first privatisation laws were enacted.   
 
In February 1995 the Romanian Europe Agreement came into force and,  with a 
number of other ex-communist states, Romania in June of 1995 officially 
applied to become a member of the European Union.  As part of this application 
Romania drew up a national strategy in preparation for accession to the Union, 
however it soon became very clear that even with this national strategy, the 
number of limited and fairly ineffectual reforms that the Romanian leadership 
had initiated since 1989 meant the country was falling behind as a viable 
candidate for membership when compared to both other ex-communist states,  
and the EU evaluation of Romania under the various criteria established at 
Copenhagen and Essen.  Even in July 1995 when most prices were finally 
liberalised and the second round of voucher privatisation was launched, it can be 
seen that with the country moving towards another electoral round in 1996 the 
lack of any real reform, especially in matters of foreign direct investment 
(compare Romania with 417 and Poland with 3,617 in 1995)130 helped to result 
in an increase both in imports and inflation (38.8% in 1996 when compared to 
19.9% in Poland and 5.8% in the Slovak Republic in 1996)131  
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Unlike Romania in 1989, the change of political system in Bulgaria was not the 
result of a violent overthrow of the leadership, rather a peaceful changing of the 
guard, as in other ex-communist Central and Eastern European states. The long 
time leader of Bulgaria, Zhivkov, was displaced by a palace coup orchestrated 
by several of his top lieutenants (led by Peter Mladenov) who quickly rebranded 
themselves as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and under pressure from the 
opposition party (Union of the Democratic Forces, UDF) organised elections for 
June 1990.  By utilising a platform of promising to protect Bulgaria from the 
consequences of market reform (proposed by the UDF with a plan for ‘shock 
therapy’ reform of the nation’s economy) the BSP presented themselves to the 
population as the defenders of the Bulgarian nation. This stance, and electoral 
intimidation in the Bulgarian countryside,  led to the BSP retaining power in the 
first elections.132   
 
The BSP government was notably ambivalent about the EU , a change from the 
idea of ‘return to Europe’ so popular in other Central and Eastern states. In the 
first year of ex-communist rule, no real reforms can be seen in Bulgaria, and 
electoral instability in 1991 led to the UDF government narrowly winning the 
parliamentary elections.133  The new government instigated some reforms, most 
consumer prices and interest rates were liberalised, import controls were 
removed and the first competition law and commercial codes were enacted.134  
The UDF tried to limit Bulgaria’s dependence on Moscow and to become a 
more attractive partner for Western states and institutions135, but the reform 
process was once again stalled after the collapse of the UDF government in 
1992, and the development of a new coalition led by Lyuben Berov and 
supported by the MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a minority Turkish 
party).  Berov relied on the support of the BSP for many of its policies, and was 
close to the BSP on ideological grounds, especially in relation to Bulgaria’s 
historic and religious ties to Russia.136  Bulgarian reform in 1992 was nominal at 
best, the governing authority following the same stagnation of reform as the 
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BSP government, adopting new laws on banking and privatisation137 which were 
laws on paper only, with no real progress being seen after the adoption for the 
implementation of these laws.  Bulgaria was admitted to the Council of Europe 
after acceding to EU conditionality removing a clause in their Constitution 
forbidding the creation of ethnic and religious political parties.138  1993 saw the 
first small-scale privatisation law adopted while large-scale privatisation began 
but “economic corruption disfigured economic reform … distorting new 
institutions, undermining the belief of citizens in the market economy and 
robbing the coffers of the state”139   
 
Another electoral stalemate in 1994 led to yet another election in Bulgaria.  The 
BSP party promised the population gradual market reforms to lead the country 
towards both a prosperous economy and EU membership140, a strategy that 
returned the BSP to power, and as part of the fulfilment of this strategy  made an 
application for EU membership after Copenhagen, along with other Central and 
Eastern European states. This new BSP leadership quickly reverted to its 
previous rent-seeking policies, economic reforms were woefully slow and FDI 
negligible, leading to the situation in 1994 where the government reversed some 
economic reforms and BSP politicians were directly involved in the theft of 
assets from state enterprises and the appropriations of loans from state banks.141  
 
 
A key factor in any transitioning country is the quality of state institutions and 
how quickly they were transformed as part of the reform process.  Grabbe 
suggests that Bulgaria’s institutional reform took longer than other potential 
member states because of the inertia of the ruling BSP government.142  In 
addition to this, the fact that the BSP government made no effort until 1996 to 
deal with the serious financial problems facing large state-owned industrial 
firms, especially with delays in privatisation after the abolition of central 
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planning and inconsistent economic policies in this first phase of transition led 
to an erosion of financial discipline in the economy.143  Reporting from the 
World Bank, OECD as well as the European Union itself regularly pointed to 
the lack of reform in Bulgaria stemming from inadequate institutional 
capacity.144  Some nominal reforms were promulgated in 1994, including the 
adoption of the first bankruptcy law and the introduction of VAT, however these 
were not enough to hold off the currency crisis of 1994 (in which the Bulgarian 
lev became devalued almost 100% driving up inflation rates to 120% by year-
end145).  
 
When applying the decisions made at Copenhagen and Essen in 1994, this lack 
of reform due to the stagnant political situation can be seen to be a clear 
indication not only that Bulgaria could in no way be ready to be considered a 
candidate for accession, but that the country’s leaders were not actively 
implementing policy that would change this situation.  Membership under the 
Copenhagen Criteria meant that a candidate country has to show the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the 
protection of minorities and the existence of a functioning market economy that 
could cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.  In 
1994 Bulgaria did not meet any of these criteria, and the governing authorities 
seemed in no way inclined to reform to meet them.  The leverage shown towards 
candidate countries after the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria was more 
focused on the political rather than economic criteria, especially in regards to 
ethnic and border-related problems (which were not an significant issue in 
Bulgaria at this time).146   The economic problems of Bulgaria were not as 
important to the EU as political issues in other Central and Eastern states, 
allowing the BSP government to continue with its corruption of the economic 
system for its own gain.   
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In 1995 the EU – Bulgaria Association Agreement147 came into effect. The 
Bulgarian government adopted railway and securities laws and established a 
securities commission.  Price controls were reinstalled to counteract the 
currency crisis of 1994, however the governments rent-seeking tendencies were 
still not curbed, one example being that friends of the BSP premier Videnov 
exported so much wheat for their own profit that they caused a severe grain 
shortage for several weeks.148  Videnov presided over an unprecedented 
redistribution of national wealth, culminating in the processing of banked 
savings being redirected towards independent financial groups, bankrupting 
several bank and contributing to the collapse of the Bulgarian banking system in 
1996.149  
 
4.3 1996-7  The Years of Crisis 
 
 When using the Copenhagen Criteria as the guideline for membership and the 
economic situation in the lead-up to the 1996 elections in Romania, there is 
little to show that in the seven years of various coalition governments led by 
Iliescu, there was any serious attempt made to actively pursue a policy of 
reform that would lead to European Union membership for Romania.  It is 
here that Vacudova’s central thesis regarding the EU’s active leverage on 
illiberal governments can be realised, as governmental opposition, reacting to 
the lack of true reform and the continuous inflationary pressure began to 
organise their election platform around working together in a coalition with 
the central ‘focal point of cooperation’ being in agreement that the most 
sensible path for Romania was to actively work to meet EU requirements and 
ensure eventual EU membership.150  Iliescu’s usual methods of using 
nationalism and ethnic intolerance were not successful during this election, 
with the success of the umbrella organisation the Democratic Convention of 
Romania (CDR) led by Emil Constantiecu, forming a coalition government 
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with the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) and the Social 
Democratic Union (USD) all of whom had campaigned strongly on the idea 
that the previous Iliescu-led government had failed to follow through on its 
promises, especially in regards to EU membership. With Contstantiecu’s 
nomination of Victor Ciorbea as Prime Minister, the president had given a 
clear indication that reform in Romania was to be the new coalition’s top 
priority.  A number of reforms were launched into, including further price 
liberalisation, the unification of the exchange rate, and the commencement of 
large-scale privatisation.  As with other CEE states, reforms of this kind were 
necessary to stimulate the transition of the country to a fully functioning 
market economy, and as with these states some short-term economic downturn 
was unavoidable due to these measures.  However, in line with Romania’s 
previous seven-year history of reform, the coalition government again made it 
difficult to push through real reform, once again reverting to the previous 
governments programme of promising reform and enacting legislation, which 
in reality can be seen as nothing more than words on paper. 151    
 
Using as an indicator inflation – GDP inflator, it is possible to illustrate how 
inflationary pressure was effectively ignored by the successive Romanians 
governments from 1989-1997 as part of their stagnant economic policies, in 
contrast to Poland and Hungary, who as can be seen in the figure below, 
managed as part of their effective economic reform to maintain steady 
inflation as part of the economic reform process. 
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Figure 11. Inflation–GDP Deflator (annual %) Romania, Poland and Hungary (data 
source:World Bank) 
The 1997-2000 programme of the government noted that it would ‘speed up 
the process of harmonising Romanian legislation with that of the Community’ 
with special attention to be paid to free competition and enforcement.152   The 
impact of the European Union on Romania can be directly measured during 
this time-period.  The initial report from the Commission, issued by the 
Luxembourg Council in July 1997 regarding the potential consideration of 
Romania as a potential candidate for accession, in spite of the newly 
implemented programme towards accession launched by the newly 
government concluded that 
“- the current improvement in Romania, following the arrival in power 
of a new government, indicates that Romania is on its way to satisfy 
the political criteria; 
- Romania has made considerable progress in the creation of a market 
economy, but it would still face serious difficulties to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the 
medium term; 
- despite the progress that has been made, Romania has neither 
transposed nor taken on the essential elements of the acquis, 
particularly as regards the internal market. It is therefore uncertain 
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whether Romania will be in a position to assume the obligations of 
membership in the medium term. In addition, considerable efforts will 
be needed in the areas of environment, transport, employment and 
social affairs, justice and home affairs as well as agriculture. More 
generally, substantial administrative reform will be indispensable if 
Romania is to have the structures to apply and enforce the acquis 
effectively. 
  In the light of these considerations, the Commission considers that 
negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened 
with Romania as soon as it has made sufficient progress in satisfying 
the conditions of membership defined by the European Council in 
Copenhagen.”153 
 
For Romania, this lack of progress regarding the country’s EU candidacy (as 
outlined by the Commission Opinion) was to have a direct result on the country 
itself.  Even with the new governments declaration that joining the EU was the 
first priority, the decision contained in this Opinion that the country could not be 
considered a candidate for EU Member State status was to mean two more years 
in which the government stated their commitment to reform in order to satisfy 
the Commissions clear directives contained in the above Opinion, yet in reality 
the reforms were not explicitly carried out.  Officials in Romania could barely 
contain their disappointment that their country should not be invited to negotiate 
membership status at this time.154  The official reaction to the Opinion was to 
contest its conclusions as referred to earlier with the quote from Romania’s 
Foreign Minister regarding the deferment of negotiations.155 
 
With the new government in place in 1997 it seemed as though real reforms 
would be coming to Romania, however the attempted implementation of ‘shock 
therapy’ in January coupled with the resultant price rises prompted trade union 
demonstrations in February which were to last throughout the year, prompting 
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many concessions from the government, as well as increasing concern from the 
IMF who, while following these events closely became anxious about the slow 
rate of reform in July, especially privatisation.156   The government was further 
encouraged to keep up its reform programme in December 1997 with the second 
Luxembourg Council decision to include Romania in the  EU accession process 
to be launched in March 1998.   
 
For Bulgaria the banking collapse in 1996 was just one in a series of major 
events to overtake the country at this time.  Lack of any real economic reform 
culminated in 1996 in not only the banking crisis, but also the collapse of the 
Bulgarian currency (which was devalued by over 200% by year end, forcing 
inflation to an excess of 310%157), revelations of connections between the mafia 
and government leaders and a lack of bread shortages which led to huge public 
demonstrations.   As with the situation in Romania in 1996-7 discussed above, 
the situation in Bulgaria using as an indicator inflation – GDP inflator can be 
used to illustrate the inflationary pressure in Bulgaria 1989-1997, in contrast to 
Poland and Hungary. 
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Figure 12. Inflation–GDP Deflator (annual %) Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary (data 
source:World Bank) 
                                                 
156Geoffrey Swain and Nigel Swain Eastern Europe Since 1945, (Houndsmills:  Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003)  p 248 
157
 Bristow, p 10 
 75 
 
While the government struggled to continue, restructuring the banking sector 
and starting the first round of voucher privatisation, this groundswell of public 
opinion caused the BSP to leave office at the end of 1996 and new elections 
were scheduled.  For opposition parties this economic crisis was the lynchpin for 
what Vachudova has termed the ‘principal focal point of cooperation.’158  The 
debate about Europe focused on which party could make progress towards the 
EU fastest159, while the BSP government was seen as leading the country away 
from EU membership.  The UDF made joining the EU the centre of its 
campaign platform, promising to reform and fix the economy and deal to the 
corruption in the country, promising to move Bulgaria forward in the pre-
accession process.  This platform was a success as the UDF (under Ivan Kostov) 
came to power in 1997.   
 
This new coalition government united a number of smaller parties from all sides 
of the political spectrum and functioned relatively smoothly, allowing 
legislation to pass easily in parliament.160 One of the first steps taken by the new 
government was that in July 1997 a currency board was introduced to effect 
economic stabilisation (as the centrepiece of a comprehensive and stabilisation 
and reform programme), and the first round of legislation aimed at foreign direct 
investment was adopted.161  While the UDF government worked on stabilising 
the economy, the Commission issued its Opinion on Bulgaria’s application for 
membership to the European Union.  The Commission acknowledged the new 
government as being reform minded noting that “the arrival in power of a new 
government permits the conclusion that Bulgaria is on the way to satisfying the 
political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council”, however the 
Commission noted that that Bulgaria did not yet meet the criteria under either 
the political or economic criteria to be considered a candidate concluding  
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“- the current improvement in Bulgaria, following the arrival in power 
of a new government, indicates that Bulgaria is on its way to satisfy the 
political criteria; 
- Bulgaria’s progress in the creation of a market economy has been 
limited by the absence of a commitment to market-oriented economic 
policies; it would not be able to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union in the medium term;, but it would still 
face serious difficulties to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union in the medium term; 
- despite the progress that has been made, Bulgaria has neither 
transposed nor taken on the essential elements of the acquis, 
particularly as regards the internal market. It is therefore uncertain 
whether Bulgaria will be in a position to assume the obligations of 
membership in the medium term. In addition, considerable efforts will 
be needed in the areas of environment, transport, energy, justice and 
home affairs as well as agriculture. More generally, substantial 
administrative reform will be indispensable if Bulgaria is to have the 
structures to apply and enforce the acquis effectively. 
In the light of these considerations, the Commission considers that 
negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened 
with Bulgaria as soon as it has made sufficient progress in satisfying 
the conditions of membership defined by the European Council in 
Copenhagen.”162 
 
Bulgarian reactions to not being invited to negotiate membership were the same 
as Romania’s as related earlier in this section. The negative opinion of the 
Commission that Bulgaria and Romania were not viable candidates for EU 
membership was to prove the impetus for these two countries to move into the 
next phase, real transition, in which both countries implemented true and lasting 
reforms, and were guided by European conditionality into transforming into 
candidates for the Union. 
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4.4  Real Transition 1998-2007 
  
For both Romania and Bulgaria real transition can really only be seen to have 
been implemented after the changes to pro-EU reform governments in 1996-7.  
1998-2007 is the most important time period in the transition process for both 
countries, as it is only from 1998 onwards that there can be measured an active 
implementation of political and economic reform linked explicitly with the 
target of EU accession. 
 
In Romania a number of laws were enacted in 1998 in an effort to move towards 
EU membership, including the enactment of competition law, new banking 
legislation, and the beginning of privatisation of the telecommunications and 
banking industry.   In March 1998 Romania tabled its National Programme for 
the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) acquiescing to EU conditionality by 
outlining its plans to reach the objectives set out in the Accession  Partnership.    
The 1998 Regular Report  concluded  
 
“Romania has accelerated the pace of transposition in agriculture, 
energy, transport, regional development and some areas of the internal 
market. Implementation and enforcement capacities are not yet 
sufficiently developed however to ensure the effective application of 
this legislation. While Romania has addressed certain aspects of the 
administrative capacity short term Accession Partnership priority 
(regional development) other short term priorities have not been 
satisfactorily addressed such as the internal market (restructuring of the 
banking sector, public procurement, state aids), the justice and home 
affairs (fight against organised crime and corruption, border 
management, demilitarisation of the police) and environment 
priorities” 163 
 
Perhaps the harshest criticism concerned the Commission’s assessment of the 
Copenhagen criteria in relation to Romania, outlining 
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‘Romania meets the Copenhagen political criteria. Much remains to be 
done in rooting out corruption, improving the working of the courts 
and protecting individual liberties and the rights of the Roma. Priority 
should also be given to reform of the public administration.  Romania 
has made very little progress in the creation of a market economy and 
its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces has 
worsened’.164 
 
In response to this criticism, the Romanian government managed to reach full 
currency convertibility, as well as enacting new banking legislation (on banking 
activity, on the statute of the National Bank of Romania and on bank 
bankruptcy)165, and beginning the privatisation of the telecommunications 
industry with the selling of Romtelecom telecommunications provider.    A 
fourth privatisation law was enacted, and agreements were reached with the IMF 
and World Bank to resume lending, as well as the privatisation of the first state 
bank and the first liquidation of large farms was started. Privatisation can be 
used as a good indicator to measure reform in countries in transition.  The figure 
below outlines how ex-communist countries that instigated reform from the 
beginning of the post-communist period utilised privatisation as one of the key 
tools of the movement to a functioning market economy (one of the keystones of 
the Copenhagen Criteria, and a good example of European conditionality). By 
comparing privatisation in Romania and Hungary, two countries that 
approached transition in different ways, it can be seen just how countries that 
instigated reforms from the beginning were able to be included in the first wave 
of post-communist accession, while for Romania privatisation can really only be 
measured after 1993, with the level of privatisation in direct relation to the 
change to a pro-EU government and the transition of the economy in response to 
EU conditionality. 
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Figure.13: Share of Small Firms Privatised -  Romania and Hungary (Data Source EBRD 
Transition Reports, various years) 
  
 As can be seen from the table below (charting private sector share of GDP),  
economic reform can really only be seen substantially improve once, as has been 
discussed earlier, the years of crisis (1996-7) had passed and pro-reform, pro-EU 
accession governments were elected into leadership.  By comparing this data 
with that of Hungary, it is clearly highlighted how these two countries in 
transition began to economically improve to being almost at the level of their 
Central European counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Private Sector Share of GDP in Percentage (data source: EBRD Transition Reports, 
various years) 
Politically in 1998 the Romanian government was still unstable, with the 
governing coalition being still at somewhat of a stalemate in issues of economic 
and social reform.  This coupled with Commission criticism that Romania 
should continue its efforts to align its legislation with the acquis especially in 
the field of the proper implementation of the break-up of former State 
monopolies, the lack of effective restructuring plans, dubious stability of 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Bulgaria 60 70 75 75 
Romania 60 65 65 70 
Hungary 80 80 80 80 
 80 
conditions for foreign investment, underdeveloped domestic demands for 
products and the indebtedness of many large foreign companies166 was to mean 
for Romania that the country was moving further away from Bulgaria when it 
came to possible EU membership, and seemed to be at a standstill in fulfilling 
Commission requirements for membership.  However small the steps the reform 
government was taking, and with Commission acknowledgement that Romania 
was still not in possession of a functioning market economy, the 1999 Regular 
Report recommended that Romania be granted an invite to accession 
negotiations, a tacit acknowledgement that Romania was attempting to move in 
the right direction.  While this acknowledgement by the Commission was a clear 
attempt to use leverage to make sure that Romania continued along the path to 
reform, and to ensure that a situation was not created where an anti-reform 
platform of leadership could reimpose its views on  the political situation in the 
country, there also remains the clear idea from the Union of  using the tools of 
accession as part of the foreign policy of the EU, namely to ensure the safety 
and stability of South Eastern Europe.  This became especially important after 
the Kosovo crisis (1998-9), as many in the Council thought that to continue the 
exclusion of Romania would undermine the governments efforts at political and 
economic reform, especially after Romania’s support for the NATO bombing 
campaign against Serbia, which was not only domestically unpopular but also 
punished Romania economically.167   
 
In February 2000 Romania formally opened accession negotiations with the 
European Union.  As Romania was part of a group of ten countries moving 
through the accession process, the accession of any one of these countries was 
assessed on how quickly and competently the chapters of the acquis were 
opened and closed. The Commission still maintained close observance of the 
progress of all ten countries through Monitoring Reports., designed to inform 
the both Council and Parliament about the candidate countries progress as well 
as to guide the candidate in their preparation.   
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One of the first steps in the accession process once negotiations have been 
opened is the negotiations on the acquis chapters.  This can only be carried out 
once a candidate country has fulfilled two conditions, namely, a minimum 
necessary level of adoption of the acquis, and a Position Paper outlining the 
situation and present future programmes for fulfilling the requirements of 
accession.  By the end of 2000 Romania has submitted Position Papers for 13 
chapters, nine being opened and six provisionally closed.   Romania was not 
institutionally ready in 2000 to begin the coordination needed to negotiate the 
acquis chapters, with the National Delegation of Negotiations being created at 
the same time as the opening of negotiations.   As Romania began to lag behind 
other candidate countries quite quickly in accession negotiations, this was 
remedied in 2001 with the Ministry of European Integration being specially 
created by the Romanian government to coordinate the country’s accession 
negotiations.168   
 
In the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission, Romania was judged to have 
met the 1999 Accession Partnership’s short-term priorities, but warnings were 
given regarding these priorities to ensure that the 1999 reform process was to be 
continuous.169  Once again the Romanian governmental situation changed.  Ion 
Iliescu, the illiberal leader of the first seven years of transition regained power, 
mostly due to the Romanian population’s general disenchantment with the 
present governments reform progress and the continuing levels of corruption 
still evident in the country.  Iliescu, realising the different priorities of the 
Romanian population from when he was last in power, continued with the 
previous governments reform process, earning praise from the Word Bank, 
EBRD and the European Commission for tackling stalled economic reforms, 
including restoring the economy to positive growth from the recession years of 
1997-2000.  170  The Ministry of European Integration in 2001, continuing under 
the Iliescu – Nastase government, took a more structured approach to the 
accession process, setting for the country a strategic objective of, by the end of 
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2001, drawing up and sending to Brussels position papers of all the outstanding 
acquis chapters171.  A special privatisation agency (APAPS) was established, 
with its first action being the privatising of both the largest steel-maker, and the 
second largest state bank.    
 
By the end of 2001 twenty-nine negotiating chapters had been transmitted to the 
Commission, with Romania opening seventeen chapters and provisionally 
closing nine.  After two years of reporting no progress in the area of economic 
policy by the Commission, the November 2001 evaluation noted that Romania 
had ‘made progress in implementing the numerous priorities linked to economic 
criteria …and a medium-term economic strategy had been developed’172  
Reform continued apace in 2002, with the Romanian government adopting new 
tax laws (on both VAT  and profit tax173)  and beginning the privatisation of the 
largest state-owned bank (Banca Comerciala Romana). The impact of these 
reforms can be seen below in the charting of the level of foreign direct 
investment in Romania from 1991 – 2004.  This clearly shows the impact the 
economic reforms passed by the pro-EU government after 1997 were having in 
strengthening the economy in the movement towards a functioning market 
economy. 
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Figure 15: Foreign Direct Investment, net(US$ millions) – Romania (Data source: EBRD 
Transition Reports, various years) 
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The European Council at Copenhagen (December 2002) can be seen in the 
accession process as one of the most important council’s on the road to 
accession for Romania.  It was during this Council that 2007 was set as the 
goal for accession to the EU, with Romania being specifically promised that 
the ‘enlargement negotiations with them would continue without delay on the 
basis of the same principles that had applied to the other candidates.’174  The 
Council adopted a Roadmap for Romania, which set out tasks to be completed 
by the country, and extra financial assistance to help these tasks be achieved.  
The Roadmap for Romania  
 
“concentrates on administrative and judicial capacities, economic 
reform and the chapters of the acquis. The current situation in these 
three areas is described and steps to be taken are indicated. Key areas 
for the reform of the public administration and the reform of the 
judiciary are highlighted. The Commission will support these reforms 
through the Phare programme. Priority areas for the economic reform 
are set out: rate of inflation, inter-enterprise arrears, wage bill in the 
public sector, energy costs, tax reform, budgetary reform, bankruptcy 
procedures, development of financial intermediation, enforcement of 
property rights, transactions and prices of agricultural land, public 
enterprise reform, completion of privatisation in the banking sector, 
public investment in infrastructure, education, the environment and 
health, and reduction of State aid. Finally, for each of the chapters of 
the acquis, the necessary measures are indicated.”175 
 
The adoption of this Roadmap was a clear sign of active leverage being applied 
to Romania to continue the accession process, with the Roadmap utilising EU 
conditionality, detailing exact tasks that needed to be fulfilled before Romania 
could accede to the Union.  By the end of 2002 Romania had opened 
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negotiations on 30 chapters, of which sixteen were provisionally closed, 176  and 
was also invited to join NATO in November 2002. 
 
Romania’s priority for 2003 was the focusing on those chapters concerned with 
the internal market, as well as substantial advancement in the provisional 
closing of chapters.177  A new labour code was enacted in March 2003178, 
bringing Romania into line with EU legislation, while the euro became the 
reference currency for open market operations.  The European Council at 
Thessaloniki (June 2003) and Brussels (December 2003) recognised Romania’s 
efforts, with the 2003 Regular Report acknowledging Romania’s provisionally 
closing of 20 chapters of the acquis.179   
 
2004 was an exceptionally difficult year for the Romanian accession process. 
Those chapters that remained open included some of the most difficult (justice 
and home affairs, competition and environment).  In June 2004 the Romanian 
government passed a series of laws designed to reform the judiciary and 
strengthen the role of the Superior Council of the Magistrates, a strong and 
independent judiciary being one of the cornerstones of EU conditionality.  
Competition law was strengthened with amendments to earlier competition laws 
strengthening the role of the Competition Council by giving it exclusive 
administrative authority over competition issues.180  In the business area, a new 
law on the registration and authorisation of business was adopted181 while 
privatisation of large state-owned enterprises continued.  In the Communication 
from the Commission [COM(2004), 6 November 2004], the Commission stated 
its wish to conclude negotiations with Romania by the end of 2004, 
acknowledging that Romania had only three chapters left to negotiate 
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(competition, environment and justice and home affairs)  The Communication 
concluded that Romania would not immediately adopt the euro upon accession, 
and that the removal of border controls would be decided upon by each Member 
State.  In recognition of the slow pace of reform in Romania, and as an incentive 
for reform to be concluded in a timely manner, the Commission inserted three 
safeguard clauses into the Accession Treaty for Romania (which had started 
being drawn up in June 2004), concerning the areas of justice and home affairs, 
the economy and the internal market, which were specifically placed in the 
accession treaty to allow for any serious shortcomings. As an added incentive, a 
specific safeguard clause was also entered, specifically for the fifth wave of 
enlargement of Romania and Bulgaria, which would allow the accession date to 
be postponed to January 2008 if the conditions of accession were not fulfilled in 
time.182  This new clause, applied for the first time by the Commission to a 
candidate country was a new form of direct leverage aimed at Romania, to 
ensure that the country continued to accede to European conditionality in regard 
to its reform process.   
 
2004 also saw another change in government, Iliescu being narrowly defeated 
by  Traian Basescu, who appointed Calin Popescu – Tariceanu (Liberal Party) as 
leader of another coalition government.  The top priority of this new leadership 
was the continuation of the previous governments reform programme for EU 
membership.   Romania signed its Treaty of Accession to the European Union in 
Luxembourg on 25 April 2005, in which the country was scheduled to join the 
European Union on 1 January 2007.  The Monitoring Report of 2005 [COM 
(2005) 543 Final] highlighted further progress needed in a number of areas, 
including the continued fight against corruption (which was seen as affecting the 
implementation of the acquis), the slow pace of privatisation and the 
development of a sufficient administrative and judicial capacity to implement 
and enforce the acquis. The report concluded that Romania’s vigorous 
implementation of its structural reform programme should enable the country to 
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withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. However, 
this report carried a stern warning to Romania 
“There are a limited number of specific gaps in both countries’ 
preparations which give cause for serious concern.  Without immediate 
action Bulgaria and Romania will most likely not be able to fulfil their 
obligations in those specific areas by 1 January 2007.  Bulgaria and 
Romania hold the key to their accession on time; even more than in the 
past years, they need to take firm and decisive steps to tackle these 
issues”183 
These issues of ‘serious concern” covered the field of public procurement in free 
movement of goods, as well as the protection of intellectual and property rights 
in company law, and a significant number of issues to be addressed in the field 
of agriculture.  The last area of concern was in the field of justice and home 
affairs, in particular in regards to preparations for applying the Shengen 
acquis184.  Without the priority given by the country to these issues it was clear 
from the Commission’s special emphasis on these areas of concern that there 
was a probability that the accession safeguard clause may be implemented, 
delaying accession by a year.  While the Commission highlighted areas of 
serious concern, it should be noted that PHARE funds kept flowing towards 
both Romania and Bulgaria, as in 2005 alone € 1178.96 million was allocated to 
Romania and Bulgaria  
“comprising [of] € 921 million for national programmes, EUR 80 
million for cross-border co-operation, € 84.75 million for regional and 
horizontal programmes, € 6.31 million for nuclear safety, € 50 million 
for the decommissioning of the Kozloduy power plant in Bulgaria and 
€ 36.9 million in additional allocations following the flooding in 
Bulgaria and Romania’ 
185
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For Romania eliminating these issues of serious concern was of paramount 
importance in the lead-up to 2006, as this was the year in which the Commission 
would finalise the accession date for Romania to enter the EU, either in 2007, or 
whether the safeguard clause would be activated, delaying the accession until 
2008. The first Monitoring Report of 2006 (May) highlighted that significant 
progress had been made, with the areas of concern being cut down from 
fourteen to four.  These four areas of concern which required urgent attention  
‘– accrediting fully operational paying agencies for handling direct  
payments to farmersand operators under the common agriculture policy, 
building on progress made (acquis chapter 7); 
– setting up a proper integrated administration and control system 
(IACS) in agriculture, building on progress made (acquis chapter 7); 
– building-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line with 
the acquis on TSE and animal by-products (acquis chapter 7); 
–  tax administration IT systems ready for inter-operability with those of 
the rest of the Union, to enable a correct collection of VAT throughout 
the EU internal market (acquis chapter 10).  186 
 
along with a number of issues that were outlined as still needed to be strongly 
enforced (including ongoing judicial reforms and the fight against corruption) 
led the Commission to conclude that a further monitoring report in October 
would contain final directions for accession. From the table below it can be seen 
that corruption was indeed an area of serious concern for the EU, as there 
appeared to be from 1999 no tangible results in the fight against corruption in 
Romania, with corruption scores rising in Romania in 2000 and 2001, before 
finally beginning to drop in 2002. 
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Figure. 16: Freedom House Index (Corruption) Romania 
 
However, it can be seen that Romania was making much progress in the 
economic field from 1996.  GNI per capita tracked by the World Bank shows a 
steady increase for Romania, as part of the economic reforms implemented by 
the Romanian leadership and required by the European Union. 
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Figure 17 – GNI per capita – Romania (data source: World Bank, Atlas Method) 
 The Romanian leadership was rewarded for it continued reform pace and for 
actioning the serious areas of concern in September when the final monitoring 
report was released.  While further progress was still needed to implement the 
measures outlined, and while Romanian would still have to cooperate with the 
Cooperation and Verification mechanism  (on specific benchmarks laid out by 
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the Commission) after accession so that areas of concern could still be 
monitored by the Commission, the report concluded 
‘As a result of the progress made, Bulgaria and Romania will be in a 
position to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership on 1 
January 2007. The Commission looks forward to welcoming 
Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the European 
Union on this date.’187 
On 1 January 2007 Romania became the 27th Member State of the European 
Union, having emerged from the communist system via a violent revolution, and 
after years of political and economic instability had managed to transform itself, 
through European conditionality and direct and passive leverage into a European 
Union Member State. 
 
For Bulgaria, 1997 was also the turning point into real transition. The newly 
elected UDF government enacted a number of new measures aimed at both 
reforming the country and acquiescing to the demands for EU membership, 
including comprehensive tax reform, amendments to previous privatisation laws 
to broaden range of methods, full current accountability introduced, the adoption 
on new banking laws, reform of the energy sector, and consolidation of the stock 
exchange.  Privatisation in Bulgaria was desperately needed.  As shown earlier, 
the importance of privatisation to countries in transition cannot be ignored and 
comparisons with Hungary (a country that implemented reforms almost 
immediately after the fall of the communist leadership) go some way to showing 
just how ineffectual previous governments has been in reforming the Bulgarian 
economy post-communism. 
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Figure. 18: Share of small firms privatised (per cent ) (Data source: EBRD Transition Report 
1999) 
 
 As can be shown in Figure 14 (page 79) and Figure 23 (page 100) once the 
years of crisis have passed, there can be seen very definite progress in economic 
reforms in Bulgaria after the change of leadership to one that actively 
implemented reform in the economic sector. 
 
The path to EU membership status is not based solely on economic factors.  
Bulgaria launched a campaign of judicial and social reform in lines with the EU 
recommendations for candidacy.  Included in this were the Public Orders Act, 
the Administration Act, the Regional Development Act and the Civil Servants 
Act, all aimed at lessening the dependence of local authorities on central 
government, as well as the beginning of major reforms in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs, another essential component of EU enlargement.  In December 
1997 Bulgaria (like Romania) was encouraged to continue with its reform 
process through being allowed to participate in the accession process from 
March 1998, as decided by the Luxembourg Council.  Bulgaria’s accession 
effort sped up as a result during 1998-9, as relevant institutions were 
strengthened and parliament passed many laws for adopting the aquis.188   The 
Foreign Minister, in contrast to Romania’s full-frontal attack on the Commission 
was more muted in tone, acknowledging disappointment in the negative 
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components, but accepted that much time had been wasted in previous years due 
to lack of reform.189  Grabbe describes this policy of reform as ‘catch-up and 
imitation” which resembled the Hungarian strategy, with Bulgaria having more 
difficulty then her Hungarian counterpart due to the weakness of the country’s 
institutions.190   
 
1998 saw the first company privatised through the stock exchange, and full 
current account convertibility introduced.  In May Bulgaria presented a first 
version of its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) 
which describes in more detail the actions needed by the country to reach the 
objectives set out in the Accession Partnership.  A comprehensive reform 
strategy for the energy sector was introduced in September 1998, and a new 
telecommunications law was adopted.191  The top priority of the UDF 
government was to comply with EU conditionality in respect to accession, this 
being acknowledged in the 1998 Regular Report which noted ‘commitment to 
EU membership is high in the government agenda, one of the key foreign policy 
goals and a major inspiration for internal reform policies”192.  These reports are 
a clear indication of direct leverage from the Commission on Bulgaria, outlining 
successes and shortfalls, and giving clear direction on accession priorities.  By 
1999 the Commission had acknowledged that all candidate countries had been 
judged to have met the first political criteria for admission to the union.  The 
admission criteria are an absolute example of European conditionality, in which 
‘the Member States out the emphasis on the applicants conforming to the EU, 
rather than the EU reforming to fit the new members’193   
 
The conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 stated 
that enlargement negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania 
and Slovenia should begin in 2000, and it was underlined that each country 
would be judged on its own merit,  and that each country would have the 
possibility to move from this ‘second-wave’ into the ‘first-wave’ group who 
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were already in negotiations.194  O’Brennan concludes that the Kosovo Crisis 
was instrumental in the decision to open negotiations with Bulgaria in 1999195, a 
view agreed to by Poole who emphasises that the “closure of the Danube River 
to commercial traffic , which caused severe economic losses to Romania and 
Bulgaria, but leaders of both countries supported NATO peacekeeping efforts in 
the Balkans”196 , and Romanian and Bulgarian efforts in this regard would help 
these countries with their bid for EU membership.  Grabbe goes as far as to 
suggest that EU motivation behind opening negotiations was to reward countries 
for their support for NATO over Kosovo, and that Bulgaria in particular, who 
had made many sacrifices in maintaining economic sanctions and the oil 
embargo, should be rewarded both financially and politically.197  Accession 
negotiations were opened with Bulgaria in February 2000, and by December of 
that year Bulgaria had opened eleven chapters of the aquis.   
 
For Bulgaria, the year 2000 was also the start of the last phase of transition.  Part 
of the rapid progress of Bulgaria can be seen as stemming directly from 
Bulgarian policy-makers who desired to put some distance between the 
country’s own position and that of Romania, as well as the desire to have 
Bulgaria moved up a tier in the negotiation position, and while this was an 
admirable goal and Bulgaria had made much more progress than Romania in 
both preparations and economic reform, the country was unsuccessful in 
achieving this goal.198  The government continued its policy of accession being 
its top priority in 2001, focusing on the implementation of two strategies 
(judicial reform and combating corruption) and making further progress on 
implementing the Civil Service Law199  The Commission Regular Report of 
2001 noted that Bulgaria was close to having a functioning market economy, 
and that progress had been made in all areas of the acquis. A good way to 
illustrate this is with the percentage change in growth in real GDP as can be seen 
in the figure below.  This figure shows just how clearly the reforms can be 
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directly related to the change in government in Bulgaria post-1997 and how the 
shift to real transition relates directly to European conditionality as an effective 
tool for economic reform. 
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Figure 19: Growth in real GDP (in per cent) Bulgaria (Data source: Transition Report 2008) 
 
In 2001  The Commission especially acknowledged that ‘Good progress has 
been made in privatisation, especially as regards banks, and with structural 
reform, setting the microeconomic basis for sustained growth’200  2001 was an 
election year in Bulgaria, and while much progress had been made towards EU 
accession, the country itself still was victim to much poverty and corruption. 
Campaigning on a platform to bring significant economic improvement to the 
country a new party (National Movement Simeon II or NMSS), led by Simeon 
Saxe-Coburg (a former king who fled Bulgaria in 1946201) was elected with 
42% of the vote, forming a coalition with the MRF.202  As results of this new 
coalition did not affect an immediate change as felt by the population in the 
economic situation of the country, voters elected BSP member Georgi Paranov 
to the presidency later that year.  The BSP, like the return of Iliescu to power in 
2000 (in Romania),  had come to realise that the way forward for the country 
was to continue on the road to reform, and through this maintain popular 
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support. With the NMSS continuing to implement reform in line with the 
acquis, by the delivering of the 2002 Regular Report from the Commission, 
Bulgaria had not only provisionally closed 22 chapters of the acquis, but it was 
noted that Bulgaria had reached a the status of a functioning market economy 
with ‘good progress has been made in structural reforms, especially as regards 
procedures for market entry, the restructuring of the financial sector and 
privatisation, thus setting the microeconomic basis for a process of sustained 
growth’203.  In December 2002 the Commission adopted the Roadmap for 
Bulgaria, aimed at guiding the country towards accession in 2007, concentrating 
on administrative and judicial capacities, economic reform and the chapters of 
the acquis.  Special emphasis was placed on the implementation of a strategy 
and action plan for the reform of the judiciary.  The Roadmap also contained a 
substantial increase in pre-accession aid.  The Roadmap can be seen as a fine 
example of direct leverage by the Commission towards Bulgaria, outlining 
definite strategies to be adhered to, working towards the end goal of EU 
accession.   
 
As part of Bulgaria’s compliance with EU conditionality, new legislation was 
passed in 2003 to help facilitate market entry.  Included in this was the a law on 
the restriction of administrative regulation and control on business activity204, 
and a new energy and efficiency law which provided for the gradual 
liberalisation of the sector and to help facilitate market entry in the field of 
energy generation205  Amendments to the Civil Procedural Code and to the 
Penal Procedural Code were implemented with the aim of making court 
proceedings more efficient, and a commission was set up to implement a 
strategy for the reform of the judiciary, covering necessary constitutional 
changes, administrative justice and procedural legislation.  The Parliament also 
set up a permanent 24 member committee responsible for fighting corruption, its 
main task being to bring legislation into line with the aquis.  Freedom House 
credits the adoption of the national strategy aimed at fighting corruption and the 
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resultant establishment of the committee with helping to aid the fight against 
corruption in Bulgaria, and contributing to the fall in corruption as see in the 
Freedom House Index corruption scores laid out below.206   
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Figure 20: Freedom House Index (Corruption) Bulgaria 
 
In the 2003 Regular Report published by the Commission, Bulgaria had 
provisionally closed 26 chapters of the acquis and was considered on target for 
accession in 2007, the fight against corruption was noted as being high on the 
governments priorities, and “the amendments to the Constitution regarding the 
status of magistrates, represent an important step forward”207.  The economic 
situation was also highlighted, detailing how the government had achieved a 
high degree of macroeconomic stability due to a good policy mix.  By June 2004 
all the chapters of the acquis were provisionally closed, a financing framework 
was defined, and work began on the drawing up of the Accession Treaty, also 
with the same four safeguard clauses as were applied to Romania (mentioned 
earlier).208  With the signing of the Accession Treaty in Luxembourg on 25 
April 2005, the Bulgarian government continued its reform strategy.  The 
Accession Treaty made it clear that if reforms were to stagnate, then the 
accession of Bulgaria to the EU would be subject to the safeguard clauses of the 
Treaty.  Progress would be closely monitored by the Commission, to ensure that 
these reforms were carried out. The success of the reforms presided over by 
                                                 
206
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207
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208
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former BSP leader and Prime Minister Paranov (2000-2005), and the successful 
conclusion of the signing of the Accession Treaty, enabled the BSP party to 
regain the governmental majority in the 2005 elections.  The BSP, NMSS and 
the MRF parties formed a coalition government, headed by Sergey Stanishev as 
Prime Minister, with this coalition still remaining committed to the idea of EU 
membership, and the continued implementation of reforms to achieve this.  
 
The 2005 Monitoring Report on Bulgaria’s process, while recognizing that 
Bulgaria had reached a considerable level of alignment with the acquis in most 
policy areas, recognized that there were still sixteen areas of serious concern that 
Bulgaria had to increase efforts to address, including the fight against corruption 
and organized crime and preparations for implementing the Schengen acquis.  
This warning was given due consideration by the Bulgarian leadership, as a 
number of high level corruption cases were launched after October 2005, the 
immunity of six members of parliament being lifted in order to facilitate this 
process.  The actions of public officials became more transparent with 
amendments being made to the Law for Publicity of the Property of Persons 
Occupying High State Positions widening the range of persons required to 
publicly declare their assets.209    However, like the situation in Romania as 
discussed above, GNI indicators show a steady pace of economic reform from 
the years of financial crisis in 1996-7. 
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Figure 21: GNI per capita – Bulgaria (Data source: World Bank, Atlas method) 
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For the government and people of Bulgaria, 2006 was a year spent anxiously 
waiting for the European Commission’s final decision on whether the country 
had fulfilled enough of the conditions imposed by the Commission to allow the 
entry of the country to the European Union in January 2007, or whether this 
entrance would be deferred until 2008. Prime Minister Stanishev urged the EU 
not to postpone the entry in 2007, stating that the postponement would be 
perceived as a rejection of Bulgaria, and would be a boost to Eurosceptics in the 
country.210  On the 30th March 2006 EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn 
declared that Bulgaria had reached a “critical” phase in its preparation for EU 
accession.211  Anxiety mounted further as the Monitoring Report released on 16 
May, while still affirming the accession date of 1 January 2007,  held off on 
final confirmation of accession until another report was issued in October, 
Commission President Barosso telling the parliament that ‘the possibility of 
being ready in 2007 is do-able, but it is for the two countries to deliver’212   
The May 2006 Monitoring Report outlined six areas of serious concern that 
required urgent actions : 
– setting up a proper integrated administration and control system 
(IACS) in agriculture (acquis chapter 7); 
– building-up of rendering collection and treatment facilities in line 
with the acquis on TSE and animal by-products (acquis chapter 7); 
– clearer evidence of results in investigating and prosecuting organised 
crime networks (acquis chapter 24); 
– more effective and efficient implementation of laws for the fight 
against fraud and corruption (acquis chapter 24); 
– intensified enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions (acquis 
chapter 24);  
– strengthened financial control for the future use of structural and 
cohesion funds213 
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with the concluding statement 
‘The Commission will report on Bulgaria's and Romania's progress in 
addressing the outstanding issues no later than early October. On this 
basis, the Commission will consider whether the date of their accession 
to the European Union on 1 January 2007 can be maintained. This 
report will also specify any areas where safeguards or other remedial 
measures may be needed upon accession.’ 
giving Bulgaria five months to remedy the areas of serious concern enumerated 
above.  The release of the Commission’s Monitoring Report on 26 September 
2006, highlighted the ways in which these areas of concern had either been 
completed or were in the process of being finalised.  The report concluded with  
‘Overall, Bulgaria and Romania have made far-reaching efforts to 
adapt their legislation and administration to the laws and rules of the 
European Union. This has largely brought them into line with 
prevailing standards and practices within the European Union. 
Sustained support from the European Union will be available for 
addressing the remaining issues. Sufficient guarantees exist in the 
acquis and the Accession Treaty to ensure the proper functioning of 
EU policies and institutions. As a result of the progress made, Bulgaria 
and Romania will be in a position to take on the rights and obligations 
of EU membership on 1 January 2007. The Commission looks forward 
to welcoming Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the 
European Union on this date.214 
 
On 1 January 2007 the fifth wave of European Union enlargement was 
complete, Bulgaria having implemented the necessary reforms in a relatively 
quick timetable. It can be seen from the events enumerated above that in reality 
true and lasting reform can only be seen after the governmental change in 
leadership in 1997. Within ten years Bulgaria had managed, by complying with 
European conditionality and responding in a positive way to EU direct leverage 
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to become a member of the European Union.  As can be seen above, the impact 
of the EU on the transition for Bulgaria cannot be denied.  This can plainly be 
seen in the figure below.    By using foreign direct investment as an indicator, 
there can clearly be seen the positive impact real reform has on the level of FDI, 
a necessary economic factor for the transition on an economy to becoming a 
fully functioning market economy, one of the many conditions to be met before 
EU membership can be granted.  The table below not only shows the impact that 
economic reform has on countries in transition, but also clearly highlights how 
progress in the EU accession process directly influences economic growth in 
candidate countries. 
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Figure 22 : Foreign Direct Investment – USD Romania and Bulgaria (Data source EBRD 
Economic Statistics and Forecasts) 
  
This point can be highlighted in more detail by comparing economic transition 
in Romania and Bulgaria with that of Poland and Hungary.  The following table 
shows a clear correlation between the impact that the EU accession process has 
on potential candidate countries. 
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 Figure 23: Economic Transition in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary (data source : 
Transition Report 1999, 2009) Transition scores taken from the EBRD, where scores range from 
1 (little or no change) to 4.3 (comparable to advanced industrial economies) 
 
 In looking in detail at the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU it is 
important to stress the two periods of transition: fake and real.  While the tools 
of accession were defined in 1994 by the European Union in relation to 
enlargement, as can be seen in the period of fake transition, even having these 
forms of EU conditionality does not automatically ensure that countries will be 
able to meet these conditions with only a minimum of effort.  As can be seen 
from the reforms implemented above, it is only when these countries entered the 
real reform stage, after the election of governments dedicated to the idea of EU 
membership does true and lasting reform  begin to take place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Economic 
Transition 1999 
Economic 
Transition 2003 
Economic 
Transition 2006 
Bulgaria 2.8 3.4 3.5 
Romania 2.8 3.1 3.3 
Poland 3.5 3.5 3.7 
Hungary 3.7 3.8 4.0 
 101 
5. The Fifth Wave of EU Enlargement – What implications and 
conclusions can be drawn from this? 
 
The enlargement from 25 to 27 member states in January 2007 is not the end of 
the enlargement process of the European Union.  In 2009 there are a number of 
candidate and potential candidate countries (Croatia, Turkey, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenego 
and Serbia including Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution) with the 
EU having repeatedly affirmed its commitment to these countries for eventual 
EU membership, provided they accede to the EU’s stringent membership 
criteria.  Can any conclusions be drawn from the accession experiences of 
Romania and Bulgaria in respect to further European enlargement to the East?  
The last section of this research, before moving onto conclusions, focuses on 
answering this question.  The section is divided into two parts, the first looking 
at the situation post-enlargement 2007 in Romania and Bulgaria, while the 
second part is concerned with the implications of the 2007 enlargement on 
potential candidate countries. 
 
5.1 Romania and Bulgaria: the situation post-enlargement 
 
Vachudova states that ‘the EU’s leverage on aspiring member states appears to 
be the single best tool for promoting stability, democracy and economic 
prosperity on the European continent’215  This is clearly accurate when applied 
with European conditionality to both Romania and Bulgaria, as can be seen from 
the previous section.  But what happens once a country has become a Member 
State? Does leverage have the same impact in maintaining a sustainable reform 
process once the accession goal has been reached? For Romania and Bulgaria 
both, the 2007 enlargement was seen as the successful conclusion of their goal 
to enter the European Union. Once accession had become not only a paper but 
concrete goal for the governments of these two countries, reforms had continued 
at a steady pace.  However, the situation after 2007 in Romania and Bulgaria 
needs to be examined to analyse the continued impact of the EU after accession.  
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 Vachudova, p 247 
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Bulgaria and Romania are both subject to monitoring from the EU even after the 
accession under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM).   Using 
the CVM Reports (which are published twice a year) the Commission helps to 
not only assist in helping to reform these benchmarks, but also to chart the 
continuation of the reform process.  The first CVM report for Romania, issued 
June 27 2007, outlined the four benchmarks that needed continued reform 
(judicial reform, the establishment of an integrity agency, the tackling of high 
level corruption and the fighting of corruption within the local government). 
This report indicated that while Romania had made progress in varying degrees 
in meeting the benchmarks of the CVM the efforts were overall insufficient, and 
much more sustained progress was needed.216  The second (interim) report 
approved by the Commission in February 2008, once again noted 
“The present interim report expresses the Commission's concern on the 
absence of convincing results to date in the fight against high-level 
corruption in Romania. It suggests that Romania should particularly 
step up its efforts to achieve progress in this area ahead of the 
Commission's next report.”217 
and  
“The report concludes that delays have occurred in implementing a 
coherent recruitment strategy for the judiciary (benchmark 1), in the 
establishment of a National Integrity Agency (benchmark 2) and in 
developing an overall strategy and implementing flagship projects to 
fight local corruption (benchmark 4)”218 
 
Only one year after the accession to the European Union it appeared as though 
reforms had once again stagnated in Romania.  The Commission issued a full 
CVM Report in June 2008, which contained in more detail the monitoring of 
reform in Romania. While the Commission noted that Romania had put the 
fundamental elements of judicial reform and the fight against corruption in 
                                                 
216
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place, the foundation was fragile and decisions on corruption were highly 
politicised.  The report concluded that  
“an unequivocal and renewed commitment is needed at all levels – 
across the political spectrum, the administration and the judiciary - to 
cleanse the system of corruption and to fully respect the rule of law. 
The Commission strongly encourages Romania to intensify its reforms 
and to maintain its close cooperation with the other Member States and 
the Commission so that the significant remaining challenges can be 
tackled successfully together.”219 
The decision was made by the Commission at this time not to invoke the 
safeguard measures tied to these benchmarks that were available though the 
Accession Treaty, but rather continue with positive support from the 
Commission to help Romania finalise these benchmarks.  As can be seen earlier 
in Figure 21 (in chapter four), economic performance in Romania continued to 
increase steadily after accession, with the Commission being more focused on 
the issues raised above.  When looking at data such as EBRD transition 
indicators (see for example Figure 22), social indicators continue to show 
progress in economic and social reforms, however the Commission is correct in 
its interpretation of the areas where reforms have stagnated. 
Using indicators from Freedom House, it is possible to illustrate just how little 
actual judicial reform has been carried out in Romania in contrast to other new 
EU member states.    Data from 2000- 2008 shows that there has been little 
improvement in the development of an independent judiciary, even after 
becoming an EU Member State, Romania having the least independent judiciary 
in any of the new EU members. 
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  1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
New EU Members   
Bulgaria 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.00 2.75 2.75 
Czech Republic 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.25 2.00 2.00 
Estonia 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Hungary 1.75 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Latvia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Lithuania 2.00 1.75 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.75 1.75 
Poland 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.50 
Romania 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 4.00 
Slovakia 2.50 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.50 
Slovenia 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
 
Figure 24 : Judicial Framework and Independence Ratings 2008 (data source: Freedom House) 
   
The interim report in February 2009 stated that ‘The pace of progress noted in 
the Commission's report of July 2008 has not been maintained’220 concluding 
that ‘It is important that the Romanian authorities regain its momentum on 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption so as to reverse certain backward 
movements of recent months’221  Data from Freedom House can also be used to 
illustrate this, as  tracking of corruption levels in the new EU Member States 
show not only that does Romania have the highest level of corruption of any of 
these new members, but that it appears to be making little progress to combat 
this, when compared to countries such as Bulgaria, where the change is more 
noticeable.  Pridham discusses in his article (2007) that one of the leading 
reasons for the lack of progress especially in the areas of justice and home 
affairs and corruption stem from a combination of the ‘continuing weakness of 
the state machine…… [and] the dependency culture that remained significant 
throughout the accession period’222  It is possible to see this combination when 
examining the stagnation of progress in the reform in justice and home affairs 
and corruption, especially when those in leadership in Romania were suffering 
                                                 
220
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from a lack of  desire for judicial reform and judicial independence, being more 
inclined to accept funding to assist with reforms, which were tabled on paper, 
but not carried through.  The same can be applied to the area of corruption, 
Romanian leaders being concerned with losing their level of patronage if the on-
paper reforms of corruption they had agreed to were actually implemented. 
 
                    
  1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
New EU Members   
Bulgaria 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 
Czech Republic 3.25 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.25 
Estonia 3.25 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
Hungary 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Latvia 3.50 3.50 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00 
Lithuania 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.00 3.75 
Poland 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.25 3.00 3.00 
Romania 4.25 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 
Slovakia 3.75 3.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 
Slovenia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 
 
Figure 25 : Corruption Ratings 2008 (data source: Freedom House) 
 
 
Perhaps the more prudent course for the Commission may have been to use the 
safeguard clause as a form of direct leverage against Romania, rather than the 
more passive form of support, as it is clearly seen in the February Report that 
the stagnation of reforms that had begun directly after the accession to the Union 
has continued.   
 
Under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, Bulgaria was given six 
benchmarks as the top priority for the country ( the independence and 
accountability of the judicial system, the reform of the judicial system, reform 
and transparency of the judicial system, to fight high level corruption, to fight 
corruption within local government and to fight organised crime).  While the 
first CVM report (July 2007) noted that Bulgaria had continued to make 
progress in remedying weaknesses, there needed to be a step up in efforts in the 
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pursuit of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised 
crime.223  The interim report of February 2008 acknowledged that those  
‘areas of heavy exposure to international cooperation, such as judiciary 
reform and the borders show better progress in fulfilling the 
benchmarks than areas which have received less assistance. Future 
support should be focused on supporting the fight against corruption 
and organised crime’224   
The Corruption Perceptions Index, issued in 2007 by Transparency International 
underscored the importance of this.  This index shows that Romania and 
Bulgaria (as can be seen in the table below) rated as the countries with the 
highest corruption in the European Union, positions previously held by Poland 
and Greece225. 
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Figure 26: Transparency International – Corruption Perception Index – EU27 (Data source 
Transparency International) 
  
By the second set of reports on Bulgaria July 2008, not only can there be seen to 
be no real continuation of reforms on the benchmarks, especially those 
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concerning corruption, Bulgaria was also put on notice by the Commission after 
“investigations by the EU anti-fraud office, OLAF, into the management of EU 
funds by the Bulgarian authorities have led to the temporary suspension of pre-
accession funds and the freezing of payments under various other financial 
instruments”226. The Commission linked this fund mismanagement to the 
weakness of Bulgaria’s fight against fraud and corruption, using the temporary 
suspension as a direct leverage tool against Bulgaria to not only strengthen the 
reform of the corruption benchmarks but also to enhance substantially its 
administrative capacity to ensure that this temporary suspension did not become 
permanent.  The July 2008 report, like that of Romania also concluded that the 
safeguard clauses of the Accession Treaty would not be activated at this time, 
but rather EU support would substituted as a tool for continued reform. The 
CVM report also concluded that  
‘The onus is on the Bulgarian authorities to show the judicial system 
works and that investigations into corruption and organised crime lead 
to arrests, prosecution and, depending on the court's judgement, 
convictions with dissuasive effect and seizure of assets. So far, 
Bulgaria has not yet been able to demonstrate that its judicial system is 
working effectively in this manner. Institutions and procedures look 
good on paper but do not produce results in practice; recommendations 
are made but are not followed up. The core problems remain and need 
to be addressed urgently.’227 
While not a stagnation of reforms as such seen in Romania, the Bulgarian 
situation can be seen to be that the reforms, once implemented, were either 
structurally weak, or implemented from a framework that was out-of-date or 
structurally inefficient to deal with the requirements of the Commission.  
Bulgaria took heed of the issues in the July 2008 CVM report, responding to the 
challenges of the Commission by implementing developments under all six of 
the benchmarks, including  
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‘Further measures have been announced with the aim of reducing the 
uneven workload of the courts, improving administrative management 
and organising a transparent appointment process which assures a high 
professional quality and integrity regarding magistrates at management 
level. On the legislative side the Law on Conflict of Interest has been 
adopted and the Public Procurement Act been amended’228 
and 
‘A significant development regarding Benchmarks 4-6 (corruption and 
organised crime) was the launching of the pilot project on joint 
investigation teams composed of representatives from the prosecution, 
the State Agency for National Security (SANS), and the Ministry of 
the Interior’ 
  
The February 2009 report concluded that while significant progress has been 
made on the benchmarks thus far, this progress needs to produce convincing and 
tangible results in the next reporting period.  This lack of progress is a clear 
theme in all reporting from the EU regarding Romania and Bulgaria since the 
enlargement of 2007, and it must be seen to be clear that even with the Union 
using suspension of funds against the country as a motivator to continue reform, 
sadly both countries have fallen behind in this since joining the Union, and this 
may have implications for future enlargement, as will be seen in the next part.  It 
is perhaps prudent at this juncture to note that economic reforms in these two 
countries have not stagnated but continue at the level of recent years.  GDP per 
capita continued to rise steadily in both countries (as can be seen in the figure 
below) as well as FDI, a sign that the economic reforms taken in both countries 
in order to comply with EU membership targets have long reaching effects on 
countries in transition. 
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Figure 27 GDP Per Capita – USD (data source: EBRD Transition Report 2008) 
   
If the Union had activated the safeguard clause in the accession treaties of these 
two countries, actioning the deferment of accession by one year, the EU would 
have maintained a much tighter control on the rate of reform for these two 
countries.  As the situation stands today, the EU leverage conditions  on both 
Romania and Bulgaria have been slightly weakened  by admitting them into the 
Union in 2007, when (as can be seen from the reporting above) there are still  
areas of concern that both countries seem to be in no hurry to resolve.  In 
comparing this with the pace of reform pre-accession (from 1997) if the 
implementation of the safeguard clauses  had been activated by the European 
Union, these two countries would have stood a good chance of finalising all 
areas of concern held by the Union before they would have earned membership 
to the European Union in 2008, rather than entering in 2007 and having some 
reforms (concerned with corruption and justice and home affairs) still 
unfinished. 
 
5.2 Future enlargement – lessons from Romanian and 
Bulgarian accession 
 
  When looking at future enlargement to the East Zielonka argues persuasively 
that ‘there is sufficient evidence to argue that these countries are being subject to 
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even greater scrutiny than the countries that joined the EU in 2004”.229  In the 
case of Romania and Bulgaria, this can be clearly seen in the addition of 
safeguard clauses to the accession treaty, with the clear signal from the 
Commission that failure to comply to EU conditionality in regards to the 
membership criteria would amount to the activation of these clauses. But reform 
does not come to candidate countries from the EU alone.  Romania and Bulgaria 
are both good examples of this.  The desire to reform a country must come from 
internal forces as well, as characterised by the leading authorities.  For both 
Romania and Bulgaria, reform in the early 1990’s was negligible as these 
countries were both ruled by reconstructed communist parties, those leaders who 
had most recently held positions of power in the communist system, and had 
maintained this power after the fall of the communist system through a variety 
of mechanisms, including a lack of real reform and a weak opposition.  It is only 
through the combination of EU conditionality and leverage and a reform-minded 
pro-EU government that a country can effectively manage candidacy for the EU.  
With the establishment of a number of criteria after 1994 by the EU, clear 
guidance and financial support is given to those countries desiring to become a 
member of the Union.   
 
For candidate and potential candidate countries it is important for them to take 
lessons from the accession of Romania and Bulgaria.  Governments in Romania 
and Bulgaria both changed in 1996 – 7 when opposition parties campaigned on a 
platform of actively pursuing EU membership, which was seen as the most 
effective way to heal the countries economic and political crises.  Lack of 
reform by the countries previous leadership had not only produced poor 
economic results for both countries, turning the wave of popular support against 
them, but also led to both Romania and Bulgaria being excluded from the first 
round of Central and Eastern state enlargement.  Candidate and potential 
candidates need to be aware that the criteria of accession is one of the important 
tools of the EU’s foreign policy, and the case of Romania and Bulgaria shows 
that accession will not be granted unless the Commission is satisfied with the 
sustained progress of reforms.  Both Romania and Bulgaria from 1989 stated 
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that their main foreign policy aim was a return to Europe, but for the 
Commission this intention must be followed with real and lasting reform.  For 
potential candidate member states, it cannot be emphasised enough of the 
positive impact of accession process on economic reforms and the consolidation 
of the institutions of democracy.  As can be seen in earlier sections, once 
Bulgaria and Romania had fully committed to the enlargement process, 
economic gains can be clearly charted. Data from sources such as Freedom 
House and EBRD also clearly show that the commitment to the enlargement 
process has a clear correlation with the betterment of social indicators and the 
overall improvement of democracy scores. 
 
As seen above, for new EU member states, enlargement is not the end of the 
line.  Romania and Bulgaria are subject to close scrutiny from the Commission, 
however it can be seen, especially in the case of Romania that this scrutiny is 
not enough to halt the stagnation of reforms after the accession.  For Bulgaria, 
the suspension of EU funds has led to renewed efforts at reform, a mechanism 
which has been very effective in ensuring that the reform process was carried 
out, albeit more under direct leverage from the Commission than of a real desire 
to tackle the problems defined in the benchmarks.  For candidate and potential 
candidate countries it can be seen that the level of scrutiny applied to Romania 
and Bulgaria both pre and post-accession will be applied to them at the same 
level.  Already candidate countries are following the same path taken as 
Romania and Bulgaria.  A pro-Western government was elected in Croatia in 
2000, launching political and economic reforms to help form a closer 
relationship with the EU, culminating in an application for membership in 2003, 
and the opening of negotiations in 2005.230  The Former Yugoslav Republic of  
Macedonia was granted an Accession Partnership in 2007, while Turkey (who’s 
candidacy has always been somewhat controversial) was granted a revised 
Accession Partnership in 2007 (the first one being adopted in 2001).  
 
The 2004 enlargement can be seen as the enlargement when European 
conditionality came into play.  The importance of both the Copenhagen Criteria 
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and the aquis as tools of conditionality for enlargement were extremely effective 
for both the EU and for the candidate countries, and this conditionality was only 
strengthened when applied to the 2007 candidate countries, with the inclusion of 
safeguard clauses into Romania and Bulgaria’s accession treaties, and the 
continuance of monitoring post-accession.  For today’s candidate countries the 
refinement process of enlargement from Brussels continues.  In relation to the 
situation in the Western Balkans a new tool to enhance the enlargement process 
(the Stabilisation and Association Process) was launched in 1999, the 
Commission describing the SAP as ‘a strategy designed to help the region 
secure political and economic stabilisation while also developing a closer 
association with the EU on the way to eventual membership’231  The aquis also 
has been further refined, now consisting of thirty-five chapters, in order to help 
ease the reform process, especially in regards the implementation of the more 
difficult chapters. 
 
For all candidate and potential candidate countries, the accession process of 
Romania and Bulgaria has to be seen both as a guide and a warning.  The impact 
of the European Union on reform in these two countries cannot be denied as a 
force for positive change.  Failure on the part of these countries to effectively 
reform within the Commissions initial timeframe, unlike the countries that 
joined the Union in 2004, led directly to the situation where the countries being 
left behind their counterparts in 2004, and when they did eventually become 
members in 2007, both Romania and Bulgaria can be seen to have entered the 
Union or a more unequal footing than their 2004 counterparts, with a poorer 
economic situation and still battling some major areas of concern in their 
countries.  The more prudent course of action for the Union concerning 
Romania and Bulgaria may have been to defer the accession date by one year to 
2008, to ensure that Romania and Bulgaria were sufficiently ready to enter the 
Union.  In doing this, the reforms that are still outstanding for these two 
countries (which, in Romania’s case seem to be stagnating) may have been 
completed before accession, negating the need for such close scrutiny as both 
countries are subject to post-accession.  The Union may take heed in future EU 
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enlargements to ensure that this situation does not occur again, enforcing more 
stringent policy to ensure that all reforms are completed to the EU’s satisfaction 
before accession is complete. 
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6. Conclusions – Romania, Bulgaria and the European Union 
 
When examining the history of Romania and Bulgaria, and their relationship 
with both Western Europe and the European Union it can be seen that there has 
always been a relationship, if not of equals, than in some respect, a level of 
friendship.  Both countries emerged from the Ottoman Empire with the sincere 
desire to implement democratic ideals on their new nation states, and while this 
was not wholly effective, due to a revolving set of internal and external issues 
such as war, Depression, dictatorship, there remains a constant desire from both 
Romania and Bulgaria from the events from the late 1800’s until WWII to 
emulate their European counterparts.  This desire stagnated with the 
envelopment of both these countries into the Soviet sphere of influence at the 
end of WWII, when Romania and Bulgaria were separated from Europe by the 
Iron Curtain.  Romania continued, as best it could, to maintain a relationship 
with Western Europe, while existing under a brutal dictatorship, concluding 
trade agreements with the West as well as joining GATT and the IMF. Bulgaria 
transferred her alliance to the Soviet Union,  traditionally her protector, 
receiving preferential treatment for her subservience.   
 
With the collapse of the communist system in 1989, the idea of ‘return to 
Europe’ became one of the guiding ideas of all former Soviet member states.  As 
one of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome is that any European country can 
apply to join the Union, the idea of a return to Europe was of paramount 
importance to all ex-communist states.  However, the importance of the idea 
must also be followed with action.  In 1989 the European Union had no clear 
strategy in place to deal with the desire of the Central and Eastern states to 
become members of the Union.  It was from this point forward that European 
leverage and conditionality came into force when applied to all Central and 
Eastern European countries, including Romania and Bulgaria.  The Union used 
conditionality to put the emphasis on the applicants for accession conforming to 
the EU rather than the EU reforming to fit the new members.  By the conclusion 
of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 the strategy for enlargement was slowly being 
refined, and with the codification of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, Central 
and Eastern states had been given a clear indication of the requirements of 
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accession, and a guideline for reform.  Romania and Bulgaria are a fine example 
of the impact the European Union can have on countries in transition.  
 
 From the collapse of the communist system in 1989 Romania and Bulgaria 
joined their counterparts in calls to rejoin Europe, but for these two countries the 
reality was that in the early 1990’s return to Europe was not the key priority for 
elected officials of these countries.  In both Romania and Bulgaria new 
governments were formed from the old leadership structure, building newly 
democratic parties whose sole concern was the retention of power.  Political, 
social and economic reform was low on the list of priorities. By not explicitly 
implementing reforms aimed at forming a closer relationship with the EU (in 
reality not implementing any serious reforms in the early 1990’s at all) like other 
states in Eastern and Central Europe, when the time came for the European 
Union to make some concrete decisions regarding candidate countries, Romania 
and Bulgaria were, not surprisingly, not included.   
 
Conditionality was directly applied to Romania and Bulgaria from the EU from 
the signing of the first Europe Agreements in 1993, in which the Commission 
added a some specific direct clauses to outline their belief that Romania and 
Bulgaria were not technically ready for a Europe Agreement, but were granted 
more to stabilise the area due to the developing crisis in Yugoslavia. In regards 
to EU foreign policy, this seems like a sensible solution, however for Romania 
and Bulgaria the signing of these Europe Agreements helped to legitimise the 
illiberal governments in power in these two countries, stagnating their path to 
transition and contributing to the severe political and economic crises in 1996-7.  
The power of the EU is clear even here, as if Europe Agreements were not 
signed with these countries in 1993, there may have been an opportunity for 
opposition parties to have pressed more aggressively for reform with public 
support.  It took a situation of economic crisis in both countries to usher in more 
pro-EU governments, however the damage by the previous leadership led to the 
1997 Commission Opinion that Romania and Bulgaria were judged to not be 
sufficiently ready to open accession negotiations.   
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The change in governments in both countries and the accurate opinion by the 
Commission on the state of Romania and Bulgaria’s readiness to join the Union 
in combination worked to transform both Romania and Bulgaria into potential 
member states.  By working closely with the Commission and responding 
positively to both the direct leverage and conditionality from the EU, 
(characterised by the frequent monitoring reports and pre-accession aid) 
Romania and Bulgaria began the long process of accession negotiations.  Using 
the tools of accession, the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis communautaire, 
Romania and Bulgaria had a structured framework for the reform of their 
countries.  Without these tools, it can easily be imagined that the reforms in both 
of these countries would have been much less structured and probably would not 
have been either as timely or as successful, but that both countries would have 
continued down the path they were first taking in the early 1990’s (a path 
wherein reconstructed communist governments retained power for themselves at 
the expense of reform).   
 
As seen in part four, it is possible to examine exactly the impact of the European 
Union’s conditionality tools by tracking the reform process in these two 
countries in conjunction with the Regular and Monitoring Reports of the 
European Commission.  The only conclusion to make from this is that reform 
was driven not only by the governing bodies desire to become members of the 
European Union, but was directly related to the Commissions reports on the 
progress of these two countries.  Political and legislative reform was undertaken 
within the framework of the conclusions made by these reforms, and remedies 
were sought due to the areas identified by the Commission of serious concern.   
 
From the opening of accession negotiations, scrutiny of the countries concerned 
becomes even more stringent.  From 2000, both Romania and Bulgaria’s 
transition became more successful as acquis chapters were opened and closed.  
By implementing the changes needed to open and close a chapter, accession 
countries themselves become stable, and Romania and Bulgaria are a good 
example of this.  Due to the lack of reform progress in the early stages, Romania 
and Bulgaria were still far behind their Central and Eastern counterparts when 
the work was begun on the drawing up of the Accession Treaty, which, when 
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signed had as an extra precaution from the Commission four specific safeguard 
clauses to allow for any serious shortcomings, another excellent example of EU 
direct leverage on the accession process.  For both Romania and Bulgaria it was 
a stern warning from the Commission that reforms must continue past accession 
(especially in the areas where they were behind such as justice and home affairs 
and corruption), and even with the accession date being kept at 2007, and not 
delayed to 2008, both countries are still under strict monitoring from the 
Commission even today.  But leverage from the Commission seems to have lost 
some of its impact on Romania and Bulgaria after accession.  The continued 
monitoring reports point to reforms that have either delayed or stagnated and 
Bulgaria suffered a suspension of accession funds due to corruption and 
mismanagement.  It may have been a wiser move for the Commission to activate 
the accession safeguard clause and move accession to 2008, as both countries 
reform progress in some areas such as corruption, justice and home affairs and 
organised crime,   has slowed considerably after accession.  This may not have 
been the case if the date was delayed, as the countries would have had another 
year, with their good reform pace, to make the necessary changes which they are 
struggling with now. 
 
Further research is needed on the situation of EU countries post-accession.  This 
is necessary when looking at the impact of further enlargement of the EU.  
Research needs to be undertaken to examine how the economic situation of the 
EU has been affected with the accession of two countries whose economies are 
in much poorer shape than any of the Central and Eastern states who have joined 
the EU, as the Romanian and Bulgarian economic situation mirrors many of the 
potential candidate countries who are working towards EU membership. There 
could be conceivably be a situation developing in which there are two 
“Europes” in the EU, separated by economic status. Research also needs to be 
undertaken to examine the importance of EU influence on countries in transition 
post-accession.  The EU needs to be aware of the implications of accepting 
countries into the Union that still have a number of issues to resolve even after 
accession.  This research should focus on the importance of ensuring that all 
reforms required by the Union are fulfilled to the EU’s satisfaction pre-
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accession, as it is clear from the situation of Romania and Bulgaria that much 
EU influence on a country is lost once a country has actually joined the Union. 
 
In conclusion, the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis has 
been answered.  The impact of the European Union has been shown to be the 
greatest external factor in the transition of Romania and Bulgaria. It is also 
shown in the above text that without positive EU interventions (through both 
conditionality and leverage) Romania and Bulgaria’s transition would have been 
nowhere near as successful.  Without EU intervention, it can be seen that the 
transition of these two countries could in no way be guaranteed to have 
produced either a stable political situation, or a functioning market economy.  
The benefits of EU conditionality and leverage directly outweigh any hardships 
the country may suffer during the accession reform process, with the end result 
of EU membership being the single most important goal, which guarantees 
political and economic stability and success.  Intervention from the EU, 
especially when charted in Romania and Bulgaria from 1996-7, helped to 
transform these countries into viable member states, and the lessons learned 
from Romania and Bulgaria, when not complying with this intervention, must be 
noted accordingly by candidate and potential candidate states.   
 
Without positive intervention from the EU at crucial periods, neither Romania 
or Bulgaria would have implemented the kind of change needed for them to 
fully integrate into Europe and become the latest members of the Europe Club. 
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